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INTRODUCTION 
The best-known proofs for the existence of God are the 
classic Quinque Viae, most carefully developed by St. Thomas 
Aquinas. However, these proofs do not represent the only 
efforts of thinkers to arrive at so important a fact. The 
proof from the universal consent of mankind found wide .favor 
among the Fathers of the Church. st. Anselm attempted an 
approach through our concept of God. Other men, philosophers 
and theologians, have made other efforts. It is our purpose 
in this paper to discuss one such effort. We seek to record, 
to appreciate, and to criticize what may be called the 
psychological proof for the existence of God advanced by St. 
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. 
It is true that the elements of all the classic proofs 
are to be found in St. Augustine. It is true that he attached 
special importance to the proof from the consent of the human 
race. But the argument which he developed most fully and 
most carefully is this psychological proof. We may profitably 
study this argument, not only because it may be a Sixth Way 
to prove God's existence, but because, as cayre says, "The 
1 
2 
idea of God is the central point in Augustine's thought."l 
Examining this argument, we may learn much of the method and 
the thought of this great Doctor. For, although he considered 
a proof for God's existence one of the easiest of tasks, and 
although he thought that those who are ignorant of God's 
existence must be very few in number; nevertheless, he 
systematically worked out this proof from reason. 
our task, then, will be to record as faithfully as 
possible the route taken by st. Augustine. First, we will 
trace out the argument as it appears in fullest form, in the 
De Libera Arbitrio. Then we will follow the same itinerary in 
the De Vera Religione. And yet again we will attempt to set 
down the whole proof with texts drawn also from other works 
than these two. This task accomplished, we will form an 
opinion with regard to the principle on which the proof is 
based. We will seek to answer the questions: Is it ontological? 
Does it have an ess,ential connection with st. Augustine's 
doctrine of illumination? After criticizing the proof along 
these lines and after forming a jud3IJ1ent on its validity, we 
will look into its spirit, pointing out the characteristic 
touches of st. Augustine of which it gives evidence. 
1 F. cayre, A.A., Precis de Patrologie et d'Histoire de la 
Theologie, Desclee et C!e, Paris, 193T';' I, 655: "L'wee 
de Dieu est le point central de la. pensee augustinienne." 
CF...APTER I 
THE PROOF IN THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 
The De Libero Arbitrio was written in Rome and Africa 
between the years 388 and 395. It is done in dialogue form: 
Augustine discusses the question of evil, its nature and 
particularly its source, with Evodius, a member of his house-
hold who later became Bishop of Uzala. The discussion is 
rather extended. Although the argument we are handling occurs 
in the second book, it seems well to sumn1arize the first book, 
so as to give something of the context, for this procedure will 
aid the understanding of the proof. 
Evodius introduces the question by asking whether God is 
the author of evil. Augustine points out the distinction 
between the evil that one does and the evil that one suffers; 
and adds the comment that God, since He is just,l cannot be 
the author of the former type. Moreover, since evil-doers are 
1 Aurelius Augustinus, De Libero Arbitrio, editor J.P. Migne, 
Garnier Fratres, PariB; 1877, Book I, Chapterl, Number 1; 
Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus, Tome 32, Column 1222: 
11 
••• si Deum justum fatemur, nam et fioc negare sacrilegium 
est ••• " All references to Augustine's works will be to 
this edition (PL). 
3 
punished by the just God, they must be the authors of their 
own evil deeds. 
4 
How then, asks Evodius, do,es man learn to commit evil 
deeds? Augustine answers that man does not learn this from any 
evil teacher. "For if he is evil, he is not a teacher; if he 
is a teacher, he is not evil. 11 2 The question, therefore, 
remains: Whence does it come about that we should do evil? 
Augustine admits that this is a knotty problem, since 
God is the author of all things that exist and yet cannot be 
the author of sin. He points out some of God's perfections: 
His goodness, His omnipotence, His creative activity. This he 
does to encourage Evodius to pursue the inquiry. "For God 
will be present and will make us understand what we have 
believed. 11 3 This method of calling upon God to help the 
investigation and this praise of God should be underlined. It 
is a method typical of st. Augustine, and it will recur in the 
second book, where the proof for the existence of God begins. 
Furthermore, one should note the fact that Augustine wants to 
understand what he believes by faith; that is, he wants to 
2 Ibid., I, 1, 3·; PL 32: "Si enim malus est, doctor non 
est; si doctor est, malus non est." (Col. 1223) 
3 Ibid., I, 2, 4; PL 32, 1224: "Aderit enim Deus, et nos 
intelligere quod credidimus, faciet." 
5 
proceed by way of reason, taking his starting point from that 
which he believes by faith. This purpose he repeats in the 
next chapter: "But now we are striving to know by understanding 
and to hold firmly that which we have taken on faith."4 Again 
in the fourth chapter he recalls to Evodius' mind their desire 
to investigate the problem by reason: "But you must recall 
that we have undertaken to understand that which we believe."5 
This reminder is constantly on St. Augustine's lips. He is 
endeavoring to make a philosophical investigation. 
The remainder of the first book need not delay us long. 
Taking up the question of the source of evil, Augustine says 
that it seems to come from libido or cupiditas. He then mulls 
over some objections: first, whether killing out of fear for 
one's own life is inspired by cupidity (and this leads to a 
discussion of culpable cupidity); secondly, whether the 
homicide permitted by law, as in a just war or to defend one's 
virtue or to protect one's life against an unjust attacker, 
can be traced to cupidity. Evodius' reply includes a dis-
tinction between man-made law and the divine law. This 
distinction Augustine takes up for the purpose of showing that 
4 Ibid., I, 3, 6; PL 32, 1225: "Sed nunc molimur id quod in 
1Iaem recepimus, etiam intelligendo scire ac tenere 
firmissimum." 
5 Ibid., I, 4, 10; PL 02, 1226: "Sed meminisse te oportet id 
mmc a nobis susceptum, ut intelligamus quod credimus. 11 
........ 
6 
man-made law is temporal and mutable, whereas the divine law 
is eternal and immutable and the norm according to which man-
made laws are to be judged.6 
Since the divine law states that it is proper that all 
things be well-ordered, man must be ordered properly in 
himself. But the highest faculty in man is his reason. There-
fore he is well-ordered in himself if everything in him is 
subject to reason. This right order is true wisdom; lack of 
it marks the foolish man. 
st. Augustine has now begun to speak more directly of 
his principal subject, free will. He continues. No mind can 
be forced to the service of cupidity, because cupidity of 
itself is not stronger than the mind. Consequently, the man 
who has forsaken wisdom to serve his cupidity is justly 
punished. He has indulged his own will. F~s punishment here 
consists in the errors, wanderings, and stupid decisions into 
which he falls. Moreover, he rightly suffers the loss of 
eternal life, because he has willingly taken up the service of 
cupidity which he could have refused. 
This idea Augustine repeats again and again in chapters 
12-15 of the first book, in which he answers objections, 
amplifies and illustrates his proof, points out some of its 
6 Ibid., I, 6, 15; PL 32, 1229. 
consequences. In chapter 16 he presents a summary of the 
argument given: 
Quocirca licet nunc animadvertere et 
considerare, utrum sit aliud male 
facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis, 
quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et 
per seipsam percipi t, et quas amana ami·ttere 
non potest, temporalia et quae per corpus 
hominis partem vilissimam. sentiuntur, et 
numquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna 
et miranda sectari.7 
Evodius agrees that they have indeed discovered what 
7 
evil is and whence it comes; namely from man's free will. He 
is, however, disturbed by the further problem of why God 
gave man free will, since man would not sin if he were not 
free. 
Sed quaero utrum ipsum liberum arbitrium 
quo peccandi facultatem habere con-
vincimur, oportuerit nobis dari ab eo 
qui no~ fecit. Videmur enim non fuisse 
peccaturi, si isto careremus; et metuandum 
.est ne hoc modo Deus etiam malefactorum 
nostrorum auctor existimetur.B 
Augustine promises to take up, with God's help, the problems 
of whether God gave us our free will and whether He ought to 
have done so; but puts them off until another time. 
True to his word, he does resume the discussion in the 
7 Ibid., I, 16, 34; PL 32, 1240. 
8 Ibid., I, 16, 35; PL 32, 1240 
8 
second book of the De Libero Arbitrio, the book with which we 
are really concerned, inasmuch as it contains the argument 
we are examining. 
Evodius first returns to the attack by asking why God 
gave man free will, since, if man did not possess this 
faculty, he could not sin. In answer, Augustine elicits the 
fact that God made us what we are. But it is also true that 
God would not give us anything evil, anything we ought not 
have. And yet, as we have seen, it is by means of this free 
will of ours that we sin; and we know (on authority) that we 
are justly punished for our sins. Augustine then gives the 
preliminary response that God, by punishing man for sin, 
indicates that man used his free will for another reason than 
that for which it was given. Hence he argues that the reason 
for which it was given is that man might live properly. 
Hence too, free will is a good and it is fitting that God 
give it to man. 
Evodius thereupon objects. If God gave man free will 
that he might live properly, why can it be turned aside to 
evil? Augustine replies that, if it is uncertain whether or 
not God gave us this gift, we must seek to determine whether 
it is a good gift: if it is, it certainly came from Him; 
if not, it certainly did not come from Him. But, says 
Evodius, although I know with unshakable faith that God gave 
us this gift; nevertheless, since by reason I am not certain 
that it is a good gift, I am also uncertain by reason that 
God gave it. 
9 
Ah, says Augustine, let us then begin with what we hold 
for certain. Are you certain that God exists? Evodius 
answers that he is certain with the certainty of faith. 
However, he reminds Augustine of their original purpose: "But 
now we seek to know and to understand that which we believe.n9 
Thereupon Augustine, agreeing that believing and understanding 
are two different things, launches forth on his famous proof 
for the existence of God. First, however, he demands-faith 
in God's existence, for "no one becomes capable of finding 
God, unless he first believe what he is afterwards to know.nlO 
This demand is, in reality, a request for good will on the part 
of the listener or reader, as can be seen from a reading of 
the entire chapter. 
Before Augustine plunges into the problem with which we 
are here concerned, he pauses for one important moment. He 
proves to Evodius, from the very fact of his existence, that 
the human mind is capable of attaining truth. Even if 
9 Ibid., II, 2, 5; PL 32, 1243: "sed nos id quod credimus, 
'i1"0'Sae et intelligere cupimus." 
10 Ibid., II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243: " ••• neque quisquam inveniendo 
Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit quod est postea 
cogniturus." 
10 
Evodius doubts this ability, he knows for certain that he 
exists. For one cannot doubt unless he exists. This insistence 
upon so fundamental a fact may be due to st. Augustine's 
previous acquaintance with the Manichaeans, who said that man 
could know nothing for certain. At any rate, it is a point of 
capital importance to be made at the outset of a proof from 
reason. 
continuing his plan of taking a start from that which 
is held for certain, Augustine elicits from Evodius the facts 
tha~ Evodius is, that he is alive, and that he has under-
standing. Together they arrive at the conclusion that 
understanding is the highest of these three. "Tenemus etiam 
id esse in his tribus praestantius, quod homo cum duobus 
caeteris habet, id est intelligere, quod habentem sequitur 
et esse et vivere.nll 
The next step is to show--or rather merely to get 
Evodius' consent--that man has five senses, each of which has 
its own proper object, some of which have also a common 
object. However, in addition to these external senses, there 
is a certain interior sense whose function it is to gather the 
data brought in through the external senses in such a way 
that the possessor seeks what is good for itself and avoids 
11 Ibid., II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1244. 
...... ' 
11 
what may harm it.l2 Although this interior sense is superior 
to the exterior senses,l3 it is not the reason, since it is 
clear that brutes also possess it. That it is superior to the 
external senses is shown by the fact that, whereas no exterior 
sense can be aware of itself, the interior sense both senses 
corporeal objects by means of the exterior senses and also is 
aware of the sense itself. For if it did not have this power, 
if it did not sense the difference, for example, between seeing 
and not seeing, how would it control the eye? Again, if it 
were not aware of its own life, how would it flee from what is 
harmful to that life? All this, however, can be explained on 
the sense level.l4 
Of course a difficulty at once arises: if all this can 
be explained on the sense level, how can the interior sense 
be called superior to the exterior senses? Here Augustine, 
recognizing the difficulty, pauses to recapitulate, to give 
his argument in a different way, and to lay down a principle 
which is of the first importance in his proof. 
It is true that both the exterior senses and the interior 
sense must be placed in the class of things which exist and are 
12 Ibid., II, 3, 8; PL 32, 1244: " ••• ille autem intus in 
ipsa anima." 
13 Ibid.: " ••• omnibus communiter praesidet." 
14 Ibid., II, 4, 10; PL 32, 1246. 
12 
alive. It is also true that this interior sense is not reason, 
for it does not understand. Can we say, then, that it is 
superior to the exterior senses in that it has these senses as 
its object? This is not a criterion, since the object of 
sense--or of intelligence, for that matter--is not, simply 
because it is the object, inferior to the subject. vVhat, then, 
c.an our criterion be? It is this. Just as the bodily senses 
in some way (quodam111odo} "judge" their object, so the interior 
sense "judges" and "advises" the exterior senses, recognizing 
and seeking what they need, directing them to action. Since 
that which judges about something is superior to that which is 
judged, the interior sense excels the exterior senses. This 
important principle is stated clearly in the last sentence 
of the following significant quotation. 
Quia moderatorem et judicem querndam 
hujus ~he exterior sens~ illum 
[interior sense~ esse cognosce. Nam 
et si quid huic1:l.n officio defuerit, 
ille tamquam debitum a ministro 
flagitat, sicut paulo ante disputatum 
est~ Non enim se videre, aut non 
vider·e sensus oculi videt, et quia 
non videt, non potest quid sibi 
desit, aut quid satis sit judicare; 
sed ille interior, quo a&nonetur et 
anima bestiae aperire oculum clausum, 
et quod deesse sentit implere. Nulli 
autem dubium est eum qui judicat, eo 
de quo judicat esse meliorem.l5 
15 Ibid., II, 5, 12; PL 32, 1247. 
13 
Making use of the principle, Augustine ascends higher 
in the hierarchy of beings. Reason in man is clearly seen to 
be above external corporeal objects, the exterior senses, and 
the interior sense. .F'or as the exterior sense in some way 
judges its object, and as the interior sense in some way judges 
the exterior senses, so reason in the strictest sense judges 
all these things. In fact, this principle gives justification 
to the original hierarchy which Augustine and Evodius had 
employed, namely, ~' vivere, intelligere; because living 
beings judge non-living beings and intelligent beings judge 
irrational beings, both living and non-living. Hereupon, they 
come to the conclusion that nothing in man is superior to 
reason.l6 
Now that this point has been philosophically established 
to Evodius' satisfaction, Augustine rather surprisingly asks 
whether Evodius will be willing to admit that God exists if 
only it is proved to him that something exists superior to 
man's intellect. Evodius is at first unwilling to grant this; 
for, he says, this being might still be inferior to God. 
Augustine then asks if Evodius is willing to admit that an 
external and immutable being--if such can be proved to exist 
16 Ibid., II, 6, 13; PL 32, 1248: "A. Quare vide, obsecro, 
utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura hominis 
ratione sublimius. E. Nihil omnino melius video." 
14 
above our intellects--is God, for corporeal beings and the 
senses and reason itself are all subject to change. Evodius 
grants this. Then Augustine promises to demonstrate that an 
eternal, immutable being does exist aoove our intellect and 
that either this being is God, or, if some being is superior, 
this latter is God.l7 In any case, once he has shown that this 
being superior to our intellects does exist, he will have shown 
that God exists. This will be the course the remainder of 
the proof will take. 
A pause here is in order that three important statements 
may be given proper attention. The first is that the principle 
to be used in determining one being's superiority to another 
is that that which j~dges is superior to that about which it 
judges. The second is the insistence upon God's immutability.· 
"Sed, quaeso te, si non inveneris esse aliquid supra nostram 
rationem, nisi quod aeternum et incommutabile est, dubitabisne 
hunc Deum dicereoznl8 The third is, again, that the proof is 
to proceed by way of reason, that is, it is to be philosophical. 
17 
18 
Quae si nullo adhibito corporis instrumento, 
neque per tactum, neque per gustatum, 
Ibid., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248: 11 Bene habet, nam mihi satis 
err! ostendere esse aliquid hujusmodi, quod aut fateberis 
Deum esse, aut si aliquid supra est, eum ips~ Deum esse 
concedes. Quare sive supra sit aliquid, sive non sit, 
manifestum erit Deum esse, cum ego, quod promisi, esse supra 
rationem, eodem ipso adjuvants monstravero." 
~., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248. 
neque per olfactum, neque per aures, neque 
per oculos, neque per ullum sensum se 
inferiorem, sed per seipsam [ratio} cerni t 
aeternum aliquid-et incommutabile, simul 
et seipsam inferiorem, et illum oportet Deum 
suum esse fateatur.l9 
15 
The next step in the proof for the existence of God is 
begun by an analogy. Our senses and our reason belong to us 
alone; we do not all share, for example, in one great sense of 
hearing. Augustine's sense of hearing is distinct from that 
of Evodius. However, the objects of sense are, in varying 
degrees, the common property of all. For, although two men 
tasting the same honey cannot taste the identically same portio 
of' that honey; nevertheless, the same sound can at the same 
time be heard by all in its vicinity. Some objects of sense, 
therefore, are not changed by being perceived by the senses; 
hence, they do not belbng to the nature of the sense but are 
rather common property. 
Proprium ergo et quasi privatum intelligendum 
est, quod unicuique nostrum soli est, et 
quod in se solus sentit, quod ad suam naturam 
pertinet: commune autem et quasi publicum, 
quod ab omnibus sentientibus nulla sui 
corruptione atque commutatione sentitur.20 
The point of the analogy is this: just as there are some 
objects which can, while remaining unchanged in themselves, 
19 Ibid., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248. Italics mine. 
20 Ibid., II, 7, 19; PL 32, 1251. 
,... 
------------------------------------------------------. 
16 
be perceived by the senses, and which are common to all 
sentient beings perceiving them; so there will be an object or 
objects of the reason which can be perceived by all intelligent 
beings and yet be in no wise changed by the fact that they 
are intellectually perceived. 
Is there some being which every intelligent being appre-
bends by his reason alone and which, whether apprehended or 
not, remains one and unchangeable? One such being is number. 
since number is built up of unity, it cannot be perceived by 
the senses. For the senses perceive only bodies, all of which 
are made up of innumerable parts. Moreover, the laws of number 
are eternally true and immutable; for example, " ••• quotus 
quisque numerus est ab ipso principio, totus post 1llum sit 
duplus ejus.n21 Finally, these laws are common to all who have 
understanding, but remain true whether or not they are 
rationally apprehended. Hence, we have established the fact 
that number is one of the kind of being we are seeking.22 
It occurs to Augustine that number and wisdom are joined 
together in Ecclesiasticus: "Circuivi ego et cor meum, ut 
21 Ibid., II, 8, 23; PL 32, 1253. 
22 f'51"Q., II, 8, 24; PL 32, 1253: "His et talibus multis 
documentis coguntur fateri, quibus disputantibus Deus 
donavit ingenium, et pertinacia caliginum non obducit, 
rationem veritatemque numerorum et ad sensus corporis non 
pertinere, et invertibilem sinceramque consistere, et 
omnbus ratiocinantibus ad videndum ease communem." 
Jill'"'" 
----------------------------------------------------------------------, 
17 
scirem et considerarem, et quaererem sapientiam et numerum." 
Hence he investigates wisdom to determine whether or not it 
too is the kind of being he is trying to find above the 
intellect. 
In the first place he wants to know if wisdom is common 
to all men. It would seem not, says Evodius, for different 
men consider themselves wise while engaging in very different 
enterprises: the military art, business, philosophy, etc. 
Augustine points out that wisdom is the truth in which the 
supreme Good is perceived and grasped.23 For all men seek 
what appears to them as good in all that they do, even though 
they are mistaken in regard to what actually is good. But the 
more men err in this respect, the less wise they are; for they 
go farther from the truth in which the Supreme Good is 
perceived and grasped. They are wise in proportion as they 
approach the Supreme Good which gives real happiness.24 
Hence, as all men wish to be happy, all have some notion of 
wisdom. Can we now say that one wisdom is common to all 
rational beings, or are there as many wisdoms as there are 
intellects? Evodius, still bothered by the fact that different 
23 Ibid., II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254: "Num aliam putas esse 
sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur 
summum bonum? n 
24 Ibid.: "Et quanto magis in via vitae quis errat, tanto 
minus sapit. Tanto enim magis longe est a veritate, in 
qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum." 
18 
men pursue different objects as their Supreme Good, is not yet 
convinced that there is one wisdom; nor does the analogy with 
the sun, in whose light are seen many different objects, 
completely win him over. 
Accordingly, Augustine gives several examples to prove 
his argument. He runs through several truths, several rules of 
wisdom, upon which ~11 men agree: that the incorruptible is to 
be preferred to the corruptible, that the eternal is to be 
preferred to the temporal, that like things should be compared 
with like. With each new example, he asks: "These truths go 
to make up wisdom and are held by all men, aren't they?" To 
each question Evodius is forced logically to answer: "Prorsus 
sine dubio," "Certissimum est," or "Manifestissime." Hence it 
is clear that, just as the true and unchangeable rules of 
number are common to all men, so too there are true and 
unchangeable rules of wisdom common to all.25 
To Evodius' inquiry whether or not wisdom and number are 
the same thing, Augustine devotes some time. He says that it 
25 Ibid., II, 10, 29; PL 32, 1257: ttQuam ergo verae atque 
incommutabiles aunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem 
atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus 
eam cernentibus, praesto esse dixisti; tam aunt verae 
atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis 
nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti esse veras 
atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui haec intueri valent, 
communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis." 
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seems that they are different in that, while number is found 
in all things, true wisdom is found only in some men. But, 
he concludes, be that as it may, the point to seize is that 
both are incontrovertibly true. 
Having, then, shown that wisdom is common to all men, 
Augustine must show that it is immutable and that it is 
superior to our minds. It is one and common to all intelligent 
beings, as we have shown, just as a sound is common to all who 
are present to hear it. It is unchangeable, as can best be seen 
by some examples: eternal things always were, are, and always 
will be superior to temporal; seven plus three always did make, 
do make, and always make ten. The mind also gives recognition 
to this fact by immediately accepting such truths rather than 
judging them.26 Pinally, the truth which is wisdom is superior 
to our minds. It is not inferior, since we do not judge it, 
saying that it ought to be thus and thus; but we judge according 
to it, using it as a norm. But if it were inferior we would 
judge about it, not according to it.27 It is not equal to our 
minds, since it is irmnutable, whereas our minds are forever 
26 Ibid., II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259: "cum enim quis dixerit 
aeterna temporalibus esse potiora, aut septem et tria 
decem esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed tantum ita 
esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum 
laetatur inventor." 
27 Ibid.: Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de 
rna judicaremus." 
changing. Indeed, we even judge our own minds according to 
the norm of this truth.28 It remains, therefore, that this 
truth, this wisdom, is superior to our minds. Consequently 
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we see that above our intellects there are at least number and 
, 
wisdom, both of which are eternal and immutable. 
Instead of completing his proof immediately, Augustine 
first devotes some time to the praise of wisdom. He exhorts 
Evodius to rejoice in the truth which alone suffices for 
beatitude, to rejoice in it as other men rejoice in lesser 
goods. For. this truth alone can be possessed securely at 
all times and in all places; it alone can be grasped wholly by 
many men at the same time. In a beautiful passage, reminiscent 
of Cicero's praise of the liberal arts in his Pro Arabia 29 
- , 
Augustine sings the praises of this truth. 
At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritude 
tantum adsit perseverans voluntas fruendi, 
28 Ibid., "Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec 
ver!tas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae 
aliquando earn plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc 
fatentur se esse mutabiles: cum illa in se manens nee 
proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur, nee deficiat cum minus, 
sed integra et incorrupta, et converses laetificet lumine, 
et aversos puniat caecitate. Quid, quod etiam de ipsis 
mentibus nostris secundum illam judicamus, cum de illa 
nullo modo judicare possumus-.., 
29 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Oratio pro Arabia: "Nam ceterae 
neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium neque locorum; 
at haec studia adulescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, 
secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium 
praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant 
nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur." 
nee multitudine audientium constipata 
secludit venientes, nee peragitur 
tempore, nee migrat locis, nee nocte 
intercipitur, nee umbra intercluditur, 
nee sensibus corporis subjacet. De 
toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt 
earn, omnibus proxima est, omnibus 
sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam 
deest; foris adthonet, intus docet; 
cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, 
a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus 
de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene.30 · 
This passage is included, not because of its literary 
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beauty (although that would be sufficient to justify the 
insertion), but because it aptly illustrates St. Augustine's 
affective method. Augustine continually reaches out to grasp 
with his will that which he has apprehended by his intellect. 
True, he has insisted throughout the ~ Libero Arbitrio that 
he is proceeding by way of the reason--and so he is. However, 
at the same time he is anxious to seize and possess with his 
will the eternal truth at which his reason has arrived. His 
philosophizing has a practical purpose too. 
To return to the argument itself, we have only to see 
how St. Augustine brings it to its conclusion. 'rhis he does 
very briefly. He reminds Evodius that the latter had granted 
that God's existence would be proved if it were shown at 
length that some b~ing exists above our intellects, provided 
30 Ibid., II, 14, 38; PL 32, 1262. 
~------------------------------------. 
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that no being is superior to this latter. Augustine says 
that he has, by demonstrating that some being does exist above 
our intellects, already proved that God exists; for either this 
being is itself God, or, if sone still higher being exists, this 
latter is God. In any case, Go~ exists. This they knew by 
faith; now they know it by reason also.31 Thus is the proof 
concluded. 
It appears unnecessary to give what follows in the ~ 
Libero Arbitrio. What preceded seemed important in order that 
we might see in what context the argument was set. But to give, 
even briefly, all that follows would draw us away from our 
main point. Suffice it, therefore, to say that Augustine 
proves that free will is a good thing and comes from God, that 
he answers the difficulty about the will's being able to be 
turned to evil, and that he discusses the nature of evil.32 
The course that the proof has taken may now be given 
briefly. Beginning with a demand for faith in God's existence, 
which is really an assurance of good will, Augustine proceeds 
by way of reason to prove that God exists. After he has 
31 Ibid., II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262: "Quod non jam solum indubi-
tat-Um, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sed etiam certa, 
quamvis adhuc tenuissima, forma cognitionis attingimus. 11 
32 For a well-developed summary of the entire three books of 
the De Libero Arbitrio, see Vernon J. Bourke, Ph.D., 
Au~ustine's Quest of Wisdom, Bruce Publishing Company, 
Mi waukee, 1945, 9!=101. · 
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proved the aptitude of the mind for truth, he takes his 
start from certain, evident facts: that Evodius is, that he is 
alive, that he has understanding. Then he sets up a hierarchy 
of beings in order to see if God exists at the top of this 
scale. First, there are non-living corporeal beings; then in 
sentient beings the exterior senses, above which is an interior 
sense; then in man comes reason, man's highest faculty. If 
above man's reason there is some immutable and eternal being, 
says Augustine, then God exists. Employing the principle he 
has used all along (id quod judicat eo de quo judicat est 
melius}, he shows that number and wisdom are superior to man's 
reason. ~Vhether or not these two are distinct is not here 
pertinent. The important point is that they exist, that they 
are common to all men, that they are immutable, and that they 
are superior to man's reason. Therefore, since some such thing 
exists above our minds, God exists. For God is either this 
thing, or, if there is another still higher, then the latter 
is God. In any case, God exists. 
This is the proof as St. Augustine presents it in his 
De Libero Arbitrio.33 It must be admitted that it seems 
unfinished and that it gives rise, if not to objections, at 
least to demands for a fuller explanation. It is evident that 
33 In the Libri Retractationum nothing is said which affects 
the proof. 
~ 
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it is sinuous and discursive. These questions, however, will 
be taken up in later sections of this paper. 
~-· ----------------------------------~ 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROOl', IN THE DE VERA RELIGIONE 
In this section st. Augustine's proof for the existence 
of God will be taken as it stands in the De Vera Religione and 
will be treated in much the same manner as was that contained 
in the De Libero Arbitrio. That is, the-thought which 
Augustine developed will be stated as faithfully and accurately 
as we can present it, with little added. No criticism of the 
argument will be given here, no judgment concerning its validity 
and only that comment which seems necessary in calling attention 
to some particularly significant point. Fewer references to 
the text are required in this section, since the argument in 
this work is quite brief and compact. 
The De ~ Religione was written at Tagaste between 
389 and 391, and the work is addressed to Romanianus, the 
kindly gentleman whose generosity had made it possible for the 
young Augustine to continue his studies at Carthage after his 
father's death. The purpose of the treatise is to present some 
• 
of the most fund~aental truths of Catholicism and at the same 
time to refute the Manichaeans; in fact, it is the last of 
those five works of Augustine which Paulinus of Nola referred 
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to as the Pentateuchum contra Manichaeos.l 
It seems necessary here, not to present the whole 
argument which precedes the proof for the existence of God, but 
merely to point out some of the statements which are pertinent 
to our later discussion. The first of these statements is the 
reiterated insistence upon the in~utability of God, in 
distinction to all else which is mutable. 
Quamobrem sit tibi manifestum atque 
perceptum, nullum errorem in religione 
esse potuisse, si anima pro Deo suo 
non coleret animam, aut corpus, aut 
phantasmata sua, aut horum aliqua 
duo conjuncta, aut certe simul 
omnia: sed in hac vita societati 
generis humani sine dolo temporaliter 
congruens, aeterna meditaretur, 
unum Deum colens; qui nisi permaneret 
incommutabilis, nulla mutabilis 
natura remaneret. Mutari autem 
animam posse, non quidem localiter, 
sed tamen temporaliter, suis 
affectionibus quisque cognoscit. 
Corpus vero et temporibus et locis 
esse mutabile, cuivis advertere 
facile est. Phantasmata porro 
nibil sunt aliud quam de specie 
corporis corporeo sensu attracta 
figmenta: quae memoriae mandare ut 
accepta aunt, vel partiri, vel 
multiplicare, vel contrahere, vel 
distendere, vel ordinare, vel perturbare, 
vel quolibet modo figurare cogitando 
facillimum est, sed cum verum 
quaeritur, cavere et vitare difficile.2 
1 Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom, 117-121, contains an 
excellent pr~cis of the whOTe work. 
2 De Vera Religione, 10, 18; PL 34, 130. 
~ 
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And it is to this attribute of God that Augustine constantly 
appeals in his proof. 
The second notable point is Augustine's discussion of 
the respective places of reason and of authority. In chapters 
24-28, inclusive, he treats of authority, even showing that 
reason must be used to establish the validity of authority. 
Then, in chapter 29, where he begins the proof for the existence 
of God, he shows how man is led to God by reason. 
Et quoniam de auctoritatis beneficentia, 
quantmn in praesentia satis visum est, 
locuti sumus; videamus quatenus ratio 
possit progredi a visibilibus ad 
invisibilia, et a temporalibus ad 
aeterna conscendens.3 
He begins the process by noting that every living 
substance is to be set above every non-living substance. But 
there is a hierarchy even among living substances, for that 
power is outstanding in the human soul, not by which it senses 
sensible things, but by which it forms judgments about sensible 
things. Brutes may have more acute sense perceptions than 
humans; but they cannot judge what the senses bring to them, 
whereas we can judge even the senses themselves. And it is 
clear that the one judging is more excellent than the thing 
about which the judgment is made.4 Hence, as sensitive life 
3 Ibid., 29, 53; PL 34, 145. 
4 IbiO., 29, 53; PL 34, 145: " ••• praestantiorem esse judicantem 
quam illa rea est de qua judicatur." 
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is higher than mere inanimate existence, so is rational life 
higher than both. 
This would make our rational nature the highest of 
natures, if it judges according to itself; that is, if it is 
itself the final norm for judgment. However, the reason is 
mutable, now knowing more, now less, judging better the more 
it participates in science or wisdom. Therefore, we must look 
into this science or wisdom--not that gained by sensible 
experience, but that gained by reasoning. For a certain lack 
of harmony in construction, say, may offend our senses, while 
a symmetrical arrangement pleases them. Why is this? Is it 
merely due to experience? No, it cannot be. Fbr it is 
harmony in beautiful objects which givesus pleasure. This 
harmony depends upon unity, equality, a gradation of unlike 
parts. However, since bodies are not simply one, this unity 
cannot be seen by bodily eyes nor by any sense. It can be 
perceived by the mind alone. We would not seek equality in 
bodies nor be able to judge that a corporeal object is 
imperfect, if the mind could not see what is perfect and so 
be able to compare and to judge.5 
Now all sensibly beautiful objects are changeable in 
5 Ibid., 29, 55; PL 34, 146: "Unde enim qualiscumque in 
corporibus appeteretur aequalitas, aut unde convinceretur 
longe plurimum differre a perfecta, nisi ea quae perfecta 
est mente videretur?" 
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space and time; but the unity and equality, according to which 
the mind judges these objects, is independent of space and time. 
For according to this unity and equality we judge all things, 
whatever their loca,tion in space and time: a round cartwheel 
or a round vase or a round coin. Equal years, equal months, 
equal days--all are judged "by the one identical and 
unchangeable equality.n6 Moreover, since greater and smaller 
figures or motions are judged according to the same law of 
similarity or equality, this law is greater potentially than 
all these things. In space of place or time, however, it is 
neither greater nor smaller: not greater, for then we could not 
judge lesser things according to the whole law; not smaller, 
for then we could not judge greater things by it. Hence this 
law is entirely immutable. Hence too we see that the mutable 
human mind does not judge according to itself, but according 
to this law. Therefore, there is s~mething above the human 
mind: an unchangeable law, which is called truth.7 
So far, St. Augustine has shown that sensitive life is 
above inanimate creation; that rational life is above sensitive 
life; that there is an unchangeable law, called truth, above 
6 Ibid., 30, 56; PL 34, 147: " ••• eadem una et incommutabili 
aequitate." 
7 Ibid.: "Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incom-
mutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum 
est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra 
rationem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur." 
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the mind and according to which the mind judges. Now he states 
that this immutable nature above the rational soul is God 
Himself. 
Nee jam illud ambigendum est, incom-
mutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem 
animam sit, Deum esse; et ibi esse 
primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi 
est prima sapientia.8 
The reason for this is that the mind, Wich does not judge 
of bodies according to itself, must acknowledge the superiority 
of that nature about which it cannot judge, but according to 
which it judges. Since my mind recognizes equality, I can say 
why similar parts of any body ought to correspond to one 
another. Accordingly I judge that those things are better in 
so far as they are closer to the law which I see mentally. But 
I cannot say why these things which I understand ought to be as 
they are. Why these things please us and why we love them, 
we cannot say.9 
As we judge inferior beings according to the truth, so 
only the Truth judges us. Even the Father judges according 
to this standard of truth; "non enim minor est quam ipse.ulO 
According to the same law of truth does the Son judge men. 
8 Ibid., 31, 57; PL 34, 147. 
9 T'5I'd., 31, 58; PL 34, 148: "Quare autem nobis placeant, et 
cur-ea, quando melius sapimus, vehementissime diligamus, 
ne id quidem quisquam, si ea rite intelligit, dicere 
audeb1t. 11 
10 Ibid., 31, 58; PL 34, 148 
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"Ita etiam, quantum potest, lex ipsa etiam ipse fit, secundum 
quam judicat omnia, et de qua judicare nullus potest.nll 
In this He acts much the same as men, who judge of temporal 
laws when they make them; but once these laws have been 
established, a judge does not judge about these laws, but 
according to them. Moreover, good men consult the eternal law, 
about which they cannot judge, when they decide what must be 
ordered or forbidden. To understand the difference, let it be 
noted that, when we cognize something, it suffices to see that 
tbat thing is such or such; but, when we judge, we add that it 
ought to be such or such. 
Actually the argument was completed when Augustine said 
thBt the immutable nature above reason is God Himself. 
Augustine adds an explanation of the difference between judging 
about something and judging according to it. He does this, it 
would seem, to bring out the fact that the eternal, immutable 
truth above our minds is God Himself. 
However, this fact does not seem really to be proved 
here. God is truth, but we do not use Him directly as a norm 
for judging. Perhaps St. Augustine here would say that God 
is the only sufficient reason for the truth existing above our 
intellects. Perhaps he confuses the abstracted truths which 
11 Ibid. 
~--------------------------------~ 
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we know with the subsistent Truth which is God. He certainly 
proceeds quickly and without explanation rrom the rule of 
truth above our intellects to the existence of God. Since it 
is the purpose of succeeding chapters to discuss the principle 
on which the argument is based and the validity of the proof, 
in this place the procedure which St. Augustine employed is 
simply set down. 
The course, then, that the arguraent takes is this: 
sensitive creatures are higher in the scale of being than 
inanimate things; rational beings are higher than irrational; 
but above the rational soul is the truth, according to which the 
soul judges, but about which it cannot judge. This eternal, 
immutable truth is God Himself. 
About this statement of the argument certain features may 
be noted. First the argument is philosophical, given in answer 
to the question: How can the reason lead us to God? Second, 
the procedure is up the scale of' being to that which is 
immutable. Third, the approach is through the soul, the soul's 
realization that there is something superior to itself. Fourth, 
the last step--that the immutable Truth is God--is brief, 
quick, and by no means immediately evident. It seems that some 
previous knowledge of God is required, at least the vulgar 
notion of Him. Finally, the principle used to determine the 
superiority of one being to another is the same as that used 
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in the Q! Libero Arbitrio; namely, that that which judges about 
another is superior to that about which it judges. 
The chapters of the De Vera Religione which follow are not 
pertinent to our present argument, and so may be dismissed 
without comment here. 
~--------------------------------------. 
CHAPTER III 
COMPLETE SYNTHESIS 01'1 THE PROOF 
In this section, the argument will be put together in its 
fullest form. Although it is nowhere presented by St. 
Augustine more completely than in the De Libero Arbitrio, it 
will help to gather the various presentations so as to form 
one complete statement of it.l Hence, various texts--drawn 
from De Vera Religione, De Libero Arbitrio, De Diversis 
Quaestionibus L~XXIII, Confessiones, De Ordine-- will be adduced 
in order. It is hoped thus to round out our presentation of 
the argument in St. Augustine himself. 
The great Bishop regularly begins his argument from a 
consideration of the different grades of being, showing in 
what way one is higher than another. His purpose is to arrive 
1 Charles Boyer, S.J., Essais sur la Doctrine de Saint 
Augustin, Gabriel Beauchesne-et ~s Fils, Paris, 1932, 62: 
"L'ascension tout entiere avec tous ses·degres, que saint 
Augustin reprend si souvent d'une fagon vraiment identique, 
forme un unique tout, une seule demonstration. Le sensible, 
le sens, la raison, la verite qui est au-dessus de la 
raison, voila lea etapes necessaires de l'itin~raire, quand 
il est Drace avec le souci d'etre complet." 
34 
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at God at the summit of all beings.2 Some beings merely exist, 
some have life, some have intelligence. Living beings are 
higher than those merely existing, since they have the two 
perfections of existence arid life. 3 Rational beings are higher 
in the scale, since they have intelligence as well as existence 
and life. 4 
Further to prove this gradation, St. Augustine sometimes 
even goes through the exterior senses and the interior sense, 
which so gathers the data brought in through the exterior 
senses that its possessor seeks what is good for itself and 
avoids what is harmful. The interior sense is superior to the 
exterior senses, since it both senses corporeal things and also 
is aware of the sense itself. However, since all this activity 
is on the sense level, how can it truly be said that the 
interior sense is superior? It is superior ultimately, not 
because it has the exterior senses as ita object, but because 
it in som~ way "judges" them, recognizing what they need and 
2 Let it be noted again, however, that in the De Libero 
Arbitrio he first demonstrates the aptitude 0? the mind 
for truth. 
3 De Vera Religione, 29, 52·; PL 34, 145:, "Quaelibet namque 
Viva substantia cuilibet non vivae substantiae, naturae 
lege praeponitur." 
4 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243-4: "Quia cum tria 
Sfnt haec, esse, vivere, intelligere; et lapis est, et pecus 
vivit, nee tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere; 
qui autem intelligit, eum et esse et vivere, certissimum 
est; quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia 
tria insunt, quam id cui unum vel duo desit." 
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directing them to action. The important principle used here 
and to be used again is often reiterated: "Nulli autem dubium 
est eum qui judicat, eo de quo judicat esse meliorem."5 Again, 
fiJam vero il1ud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse 
judicantem, quam illa res est de qua judicatur."6 And it is 
made use of in the statement: "Mens enim humana de visibilibus 
judicans, potest agnoscere omnibus visibilibus seipsam esse 
meliorem."7 
Up to this point, St. Augustine has proved the superiority 
of sentient life to inanimate creation, and, among the senses, 
the superiority of the interior to the exterior. He then 
pushes the argument further, in order to demonstrate that there 
is something in man higher even than the interior sense. 
Applying the principle just stated, we see that reason is 
higher than anything else in man.8 The proof of this is: "Non 
solum autem rationalis vita de sensibi1ibus, sed de ipsis 
quoque sensibus judicat."9 
Therefore, the best part of man, that which is highest in 
the scale of being, is human reason. \Vhy is St. Augustine so 
5 Ibid., II, 5, 12; PL 32, 1247. 
6 ~Vera Rel~ione, 29, 53; PL 34, 145. 
7 De D!Versis aestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28. 
8 De Libero .Arbitrio, II, 6, 13; PL 32, 1248: "A. Q;uare vide, 
oosecro, utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura 
hominis ratione sublimius. E. Nihil omnino melius video." 
9 De Vera Religione, 29, 53; PL 34, 145. 
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anxious to establish this factt The reason is that he wishes 
to prove that, if there exists a reality superior to the 
human reason, then God exists. Unless he had demonstrated that 
reason is superior to all other created beings., his argument 
could not proceed; for evidently he begins with a notion of 
God as the supreme being. Boyer puts the argument in a neat 
syllogismlO which brings out the point well. He says: 
S'il est quelque chose au dessus de 
notre raison, Dieu existe. Or il est 
quelque chose au dessus de notre 
raison. Done, Dieu existe.ll 
As was noted in the presentation of the argument in the 
De Libero Arbitrio, the apodosis of the major comes upon us 
with something of a surprise. To explain it we may say that 
the point of the preceding proof is not merely to show that 
there is nothing above the reason in man, but to lead up to the 
fact that there is something above the reason outside man. 
However, merely to prove the existence of a reality outside man 
10 It is helpful to reduce St. Augustine's argument to 
syllogistic form, but it must be noted that the scholastic 
brevity is not his. L. de Mondadon, "De la Connaissance 
de Soi-m~me )a. la Connaissance de Dieu, 11 in Recherches de 
Science Religeuse, Paris, 1913, 148, gives this warning-
while commenting on Portalie's precis of;the argument: 
11 Incontestablement, ce syllogisme a le merite de dire les 
d ' 1 i d" / chases 'une fagon a a fo s courte, egagee et claire, 
mais je'ne surprendrai personne en ajoutant que cette vive 
et seche allure ne se retrouve pas dans saint Augustin." 
11 Charles Boyer, S.J., L'Idee de Verite dans la Philosophie 
de Saint Augustin, Gabriel Beauchesne, PariB; 1920, 50. 
~--------------------------------~ 
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and superior to man's reason, is not necessarily to attain to 
God. Consequently, Augustine proceeds through the reason for 
a very definite purpose. He wishes to find there something 
which will lead him to God. This thing is truth. 
Gilson describes this procedure of St. Augustine in 
much the same way as we have given it: 
Toute notre recherche, en effet, tend 
vers un ~tre necessaire, irr~uable, 
eternal, tel qu'il n'en existe pas 
de plus grand et qui par consequent 
soit Dieu. Il ne suffit done pas de 
depasser l'homme pour atteindre un 
tel ~tre, mais il faut depasser en 
l'homrae quelque chose de tel que ce 
qui se trouve au dela ne puisse etre 
que Dieu. Or une seule voie possible 
s'ouvre devant une recherche ainsi 
engagee: cella qui passe par la verite.l2 
How does the fact that the intellect possesses truth lead 
us to God? It is due to the character of truth, its eternity 
and immutability. Augustine evidently pre-supposes a common 
notion of God as the supreme, eternal, and immutable Being. 
Hence the existence above our intellects of eternal, immutable 
truth will prove the existence of God. 
Now, the intellect recognizes that it is itself mutable 
and that there is above it immutable truth. "Quae tamen cum 
12 , ' / Etienne Gilson, Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin, 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris,-r93l, 18. 
r 
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etiam se propter defectum prof'ectumque in sapientia fatetur 
esse mutabilem, invenit supra se esse incommutabilem veritatem: 
atque ita adhaerens post ipsam ••• beata efficitur.nl3 
One class of truth is number, a favorite example of St. 
Augustine. Number is built up of unity, which CC:tnnot be 
perceived by the senses. No body can produce the notion of 
unity, since no body is simply one. 1he senses, whose object 
is corporeal substances, cannot give us the notion of unity. 
The reason cannot produce unity as an effect, because this 
notion is common to all without being changed in any way by 
the fact that it is known. 1he laws of number are eternally 
true, whether apprehended or not.l4 Therefore, number is an 
eternal, immutable truth.l5 
Another such truth is Wisdom, either in speculative or in 
moral matters. Wisdom consists in knowing and possessing the 
supreme good. "Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, 
in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum?nl6 Wisdom is common 
13 De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28. 
14 De Ordine, II, 19, 5o; PL 32, 1018: "Sed unum ad duo, vel 
duo ad quattuor, verissima ratio est: nee magis heri f'uit 
ista ratio vera quam hodie; nee magis eras aut post annum 
erit vera; nee si omnia iste mundus concidat, poterit 
ista ratio non esse." 
15 Cf'. De Libero Arbitrio, II, 8, 20-24; PL 32, l251-3;De 
Vera~e1i~ione, c. 30; PL 34, 145-7; De Ordine, II, ~; 
~2, 1o 1-3. --
16 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254. 
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to all men in that all seek the Supreme Good, whether or not 
they are mistaken in pursuing what they think is good. 
Moreover, the rules of wisdom are eternal and unchangeable. 
For example, it always has been, is, and always will be true 
that eternal things are to be preferred to temporal. Wisdom, 
therefore, constitutes another example of eternal, immutable 
truth. 
Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles 
aunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem 
atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque 
communiter omnibus eam cernentibus praesto 
esse dixisti; tam aunt verae atque 
incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de 
quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus 
respondisti esse veras atque manifestas, 
easque omnibus qui haec intueri valent, 
communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis.l7 
Having proved the existence of such truth, Augustine then 
shows that this truth is above our intellects. The intellect 
recognizes the fact that the truth is superior to it.l8 The 
truth is not inferior to reason, since the intellect does not 
judge about the laws of number or wisdom, but judges according 
to them.l9 It is not equal to reason, since the truth is 
17 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 10, 29; PL 32, 1257. 
18 "'C'r. also Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742: "Intravi 
et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum 
animae meae supra mentem meam, lucero incommutabilem." 
19 De Libero Arbitri;o, II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259: "Non examint;ttor 
corrigit, sed tantum laetatur inventor." 
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immutable, whereas human reason is mutable.2° It remains, 
then, that the truth, eternal and immutable, exists above our 
intellects. 
Sometimes St. Augustine at once brings the argu~ent to 
a close here, for this truth is God Himself. So in the De 
~ Religione he says: ":Nee jam illud ambigendum est, incom-
mutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse; 
et ibi esse primarn vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima 
sapientia."21 So too in the Confessiones he exclaims of the 
unchangeable light above his intellect: "Qui novit veritatem, 
novit earn; et qui novit earn, novit aeternitatem. Charitas 
novit eam. 0 aeterna veritas, et vera charitas, et chara 
aeternitas t tu es Deus meus; tibi suspiro die ac nocte.n22 
In the De Libero Arbitrio, however, he goes a bit 
further. He says that, by showing that there exists some 
reality above our intellects, he has shown that God exists; for 
either this reality (truth) is itself God, or, if there is some 
being above it, this latter is God. "Si enim aliquid est 
excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, jam ipsa 
veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum 
20 Ibid.: "Si autem asset aequalis mentibus nostris haec 
veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae 
aliquando earn plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc 
fatentur se esse mutabiles." 
21 De ~ Religione, 31, 57; PL 34, 147. 
22 Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742. 
r.-----------------., 
42 
tamen esse, negare non poteris."23 
Just how St. Augustine arrives at this conclusion does 
not immediately appear. The principle behind the proof will, 
however, be treated in chapter IV. Here we may note that 
Augustine gives some hint of it in the De Diversis ~uaestionibus 
LXXXIII: 
Quod autem est omni anima melius, id Deum 
dicimus ••• Intelligit autem rationalis 
anima Deum. Nam intelligit quod semper 
ejusmodi est, neque ullam patitur mutationem. 
At et corpus per tempus et locos, et anima 
ipsa rationalis, quod aliquando sapiens, 
aliquando stulta est, mutationem patitur. 
Quod autem semper eodem modo est, melius 
profecto est quam id quod non ita est. Nee 
quidquam est melius rationali anima nisi Deus.24 
Here the Bishop of Hippo evidently pre-supposes a vulgar 
notion of God as an immutable being, superior to every other 
being.25 Having, then, proved that the human reason is not the 
highest in the order of being, but that there exists an 
unchangeable reality superior to it, he concludes that God 
exists. 
23 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262. 
24 De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 54; PL 40, 38. And 
In the Retractationes, c. 26; PL 32, 627, Augustine amends 
the statement: "Ubi quod dixi, 1 Quod autem est omni anima 
melius, id Deum dicimus,' magis dici debuit, "Omni create 
spiritu melius. '" 
25 Gilson, Introduction, 12: 11 D1 abord il est clair qu'aux 
yeux de saint Augustin l'idee de Dieu est une connaissance 
universelle et naturellement inseparable de l'esprit 
humain." 
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This is the complete "psychological" argument of St. 
Augustine for the existence of God. With all its nuances, its 
long and leisurely winding, its flashes of rhetoric, it is 
typically Augustine's. Put in cold scholastic form, as we 
noted above, it loses the character given it by its author. 
However, for the sake of summary, the brief statement of it 
given by Portali~ will suffice to conclude this chapter. 
Elle repose sur la constation d'une verite 
eternelle et immuable, superieure a l'homme, 
et pourrait Btre formulee ainsi: La raison 
de l'homme ••• occupant le plus haut degre 
de la hierarchie des etres de ce monde, si 
elle decouvre un 6tre plus parfait, oet 
~tre sera Dieu. Or, ma raison constate 
~u•au-dessus d'elle, 11 y a la verite 
eternelle et immuable, qu•elle ne cree pas, 
mais qu'elle contemple, qui n'est ni mienne, 
ni en mol, puisque les autres la contemplent 
aussi bien que mol et hors de mol. Cette 
verite est done Dieu lui-meme, ou si l'on 
suppose en ~tre encore plus eleve, nous 
conduit de moins a cet ~tre, source de 
toute verite.26 
26 E. Portalie, article "Saint Augustin" in Dictionnaire de 
The6logie Catholique, editors A. Vacant et alii, Letouzey 
et Ane, Paris, 1903, I, 2345. 
r~--------~--------~ 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROOF IS BASED 
Now that the "psychological" proof has been set down as 
contained in its two principal sources and assembled completely 
in a separate section, our discussion of it may get under way. 
As was indicated in more than one place, the final step in the 
argumentation is somewhat obscure. St. Augustine proves 
~lowly and carefully that there exists an immutable reality, 
called Truth, above our intellects. Then he hastens to conclude 
that God exists. Is he justified in so doing? Is his proof 
complete in itself? If the proof is complete, on what principle 
does the final step depend? These are the questions which 
ought to be answered. 
Before discussing these questions, however, it is well 
to call to mind again that Augustine employed most of the 
traditional proofs for God's existence (although almost never 
specifically as proofs, but only as parts of se~1ons or 
meditations) and did not confine himself to this one alone. 
Usually he gave these arguments in a highly literary style, 
taking little care to develop them fully and with philosophical 
exactness. Portali~ describes his method well: 
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Il a touche a toutes les preuves classiques 
de l'existence de Dieu, mais on trouverait 
rarement chez lui une demonstration 
systematique. Il attache une importance 
particuliere au consentement du genre 
humain ••• L'antique preuve par la finalite 
et l'ordre du monde a ete developee par 
lui avec une delicatesse, une grace, une 
emotion inimitables: partout dans la 
beaute de la nature il lit le nom de 
L t archi tee te di vin ••• Mais son eloquence 
est surtout admirable quand il developpe 
la preuve metaphysique du monde fini et 
changeant, reclamant un createur infini 
et immuable.l 
The reason for bringing in this reminder is that some 
maintain that the proof we are treating is not complete in 
itself. Should this claim on examination prove correct, or 
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should it be decided that the proof is invalid, one should 
realize that St. Augustine did not pin all his rational attempts 
to prove God's existence on this single proof. 
Descoqs attacks the argument precisely on the ground 
that it is incomplete in itself. He argues that the only 
possibility of saving it is by reducing it to some other 
argument. He says: 
Mais du point de vue strictement rationnel, 
dans l'ordre du discours scientifique et 
dans le plan de la construction rigoureuse, 
d'une construction systematique et 
ordonnee de l'edifice de nos connaissances 
sur Dieu, les discussions que nous avons 
\ poursuivies dans la these, montrent assez, 
1 Portalie, "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2344. 
~--------------------~ 
nous semble-t-il, que cette preuve ne suffit 
pas, a elle toute seule, pour conclure de 
fagon efficace. Le seul moyen de lui 
conserver une valeur probante est de la 
ramener a la contingence soit par ltinter-
m~diaire des r~alites concretes d'oh lea 
idees abstraitea, interm~diai~e que nous 
avons nous-meme reconnu valable dans la 
critique de la premi~re partie de la these, 
mais une telle r~duction ne semble pas 
~tre du tout dans la ligne de pensee de 
s. Augustin; soit en consid~rant ces 
idees comme creees, comme produites en 
nous par une cause transcendante et d'ou 
nous remonterions a celle-ci par la voie de 
causalite, ou plus exactement comme un 
reflet o~ noua saisirions d'embl~e la cause 
transcendante.2 
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Even then he is dissatisfied with the proof. rr:Mais 
n'implique-t-elle pas un innatisme ou du moins toute la th~orie 
I' de l 1 illumination difficilement compatible avec lea donnees 
de la psychologie?"3 Moreover, it certainly smacks of 
ontologiam, according to the same author. Other men, as Billot, 
Mercier, and Loinaz, agree with him on this point because they 
see in the proof an illegitimate conclusion to the existence 
of God as the sufficient reason of the eternal, immutable 
truths above our intellects; whereas these truths actually have 
reality, antecedently to our knowing them, only in so far as 
they are known by the divine intellect. In other words, once 
we already know that God exists, we know the eternal reality 
2 Pedro Deacoqs, S.J., Praelectiones Tbeologiae Naturalia, 
·Gabriel Beauchesne et Sea Fila, Paris, l935, II, 131-2. 
3 ~., II, 132. 
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of these truths. But we cannot conclude to the existence of 
God, not otherwise known, as the sufficient reason of these 
truths; for, given the essences of finite things and the 
abstractive power of our intellect, there is no need to seek 
the sufficient reason for them in the existence of God. In 
this way does Descoqs, along with Billot,4 Loinaz,5 Nlercier,6 
and others, argue against the proof. Even some of its 
defenders feel that ultimately it must be reduced to one of the 
Quinque Viae in order to be complete. A full discussion of 
this question, however, is relegated to the i"'ollowing chapter. 
We record the opinion that the proof is not complete in itself 
only as an aid to our chief effort in this section: to discover 
the principle of the argument as St. Augustine understood it, 
the principle he intended to employ. 
Those who defend the argument as being complete maintain 
4 Louis Billot, S.J., De Deo Uno et Trino, Universitas 
Pontifica Gregoriana;-Rome,~35; 76 (note); " ••• argumentum 
profecto non concludit nisi ostendatur ipsam naturam 
rationalem non esse a se, sed a prima causa a qua pendet 
rerum universitas, et tunc fit reductio ad unam e quinque 
viis supra expositis. Si autem procederet argumentum ex ipsa 
obiectiva necessitate et aeternitate quam in his principiis 
mens nostra intuetur, quasi per se solam argueret exsisten-
tianl alicuius entis necessarii, sic non videtur valida 
demonstratio. 11 
5 John R. Loinaz, S.J., Praelectiones e Theologia Naturali, 
Marietti, Taurini, 1928, 81-82. Cf. 'Chapter V for opinion. 
6 D • .J. Mercier, M~taphysique GtSne'rale, Insti tut Superieur de 
Philosophie, Louvain, 1923, 40-50. His opinion too is 
treated in Chapter V of this paper. 
r.------------------~ 
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that Augustine intended that it prove the existence of God as 
in some way the sufficient reason for the eternal, universal, 
immutable truth above our intellects. But not all agree on 
the principle which he employed. 
In an article on the philosophy of St. Augustine, Van 
steenberghen briefly reviews the proof, then says in conclusion 
that the argument proves the existence of God as exemplary 
cause. 
La disjonction ~tablie entre le reel et 
l'ideal par la conception platonicienne de 
la connaissance intellectuelle, semble 
exclure une interpretation strictement 
metaphysique de 1 'argument !lideologique, n 
bien que, aux yeux de s. Augustin, lea 
caracteres-ae ra-ierfte-r~velent une 
valeur absolue, ontologique, metaphysique, 
et non pas ideale seulement. Dans cet 
argument, le rapport entre les "Incom-
mutabiliter vera" et la "Veritas 
incommutabil~semble bien impliquer lea 
notions de participation et de causalit~ 
exemplaire. - D'autre part, a cote et 
auteur de l'argument ideologique proprement 
dit, les idees de contingence, de 
causalit~, et de creation ~ont frequemment 
utilisees par s. Augustin. 7 
Not completely satisfied with this statement of his 
position, Van Steenberghen explains and qualifies it. 
I Mais ces perspectives differentes ne 
7 F'. Van Steenberghen, "La Philo sophie de ~. Augustin d' apres 
les travaux du Centenaire," in Revue N~o-Scolastique de 
Philosophie, Institut Superieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 
1933, 248. 
~ paraissent pas parfaitement unifiees et 
une mise au point s'impose: il suffir~it 
de dire, par exemple, que la n~cessite 
mitaphysique du vrai est saisie, par nous 
/ 
autres hommes, dans le reel contingent, 
pour assurer a la preuve augustinienne 
une base inebranlable. Car elle s'appuyerait 
alors sur les caract~res de nos jugements 
consid~res, non pas dans leur signification 
purement logique ou id~ale, ni dans leur 
existence/eurement psychologique, mais dans 
~ ~ leur port e metaphysique. Rattachee 
solidement a l'ordre reel, la preuve 
~ 
augustinienne devient une preuve meta-
physique authentique, ou, plus exactement, 
l'unique preuve metaphysique consid~r~e 
sous l'angle du vrai transcendental et 
\ 
aboutissant a l'affirmation de Dieu comme 
Verite subsistante et Cause premi~re 
exemplaire.8 
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This explanation is not convincing, at least if it is 
intended to prove that the argument is complete and yet not an 
ontological argument. If recourse be made to "Le reel con-
tingent"--from which the intellect can by its abstractive power 
arrive at universal truth--then there seems to be no need to 
appeal to the existence of God. And this ~tter is exactly the 
point of the whole proof. Hence Descoqs' rather trenchant 
criticism of Van Steenberghen's case seems justified. 
8 Ibid. 
La premiere partie de ces conclusions nous 
paratt certaine et ne saurait soulever de 
difficultes serieuses. La seconde en revanche 
demanderait des precisions. Hous con-
sentons sans aucune peine et nous/ 
soutenons bien en effet que 11 la necessit~ 
m~taphysique du vrai saisie dans le reel 
' contingent peut assurer a cette preuve 
metaphysique consid6r~e sous l'angle du vrai 
transcendental une base in~branlable," mais 
a la condition de l'appuyer sur la contingence 
de ce meme r~el, c'est-a-dire en derni~re 
analyse, comme l'indiquent les mots m~mes, 
sur 1 1 insuffisanceAdans l'~tre, et done sur , , la necessite de l'?tre prem~er, cause 
efficiente de ce reel, et par le fait meme, 
cause exemplaire. Si causalite exemplaire 
est detachee de l'autre, elle reate, quoad 
nos, sans point d'attache, au-dessus du 
VIae, et ne ~ prouve rien.9 
Of course a rejection of one argument adduced is not 
sufficient to throw out the whole possibility that the 
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argument is intended to prove the existence of God as exemplary 
cause. Nor is this procedure attempted here. Instead, let us 
first review other opinions. 
Boyer insists very strongly that the principle underlying 
the argument is the principle of causality. After a long 
introduction to the point, he says: "Si importante, si decisive 
m~me, en quelque sorte, qu 1 en soit la raison, il faut la dire 
sans plus attendre: le philosophe d 1 Hippone est mu par le 
principe de causalite ••• rrlO Whereupon Boyer sets forth 
numerous examples of the use Augustine made of this principle: 
in his De Genesi ad Litteram (IV, 32, 49), in his Enarrationes 
in Psalmos (Ps. 44, n. 13), in his De Trinitate (XII, 5, 5), in 
9 Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 134. 
10 Boyer, Essals, 58. 
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his De Civitate Dei (XI, 4, 2), etc. He observes rather 
disgustedly: "Certains semblent vraiment trop croire qu'il 
faille etre p~ripattticien jusqu 1 aux moelles pour avoir l'id~e 
de cause, et pour s'en servir.ull 
It is true that the examples of St. Augustine's use of 
the principle of causality would point to God as efficient 
cause. However, Boyer rather seems to hold that this 
"psychological" argument proves the existence of a God Who is 
exemplary cause. For in summarizing the argument, speaking of 
Wisdom and Truth, he says: 
Mais ces perfections, qui sont substan-
tiellement Dieu, nous les percevons a 
travers le reflet d'elles-m&mes dans 
notre arne. Leur empreinte, leur 
participation, et pour dire le mot, 
leur image, est en notre arne, est 
notre arne en sa partie superieure; et 
"' , la preuve de Dieu consiste precisement 
' ' / a aaiair que la regle de notre pensee 
et de notre vouloir, c'est-a-dire 
notre raison qui est bien n3tre et 
"' qui eat une partie de notre arne, n'est 
intelligible que comme~ar~icipation 
et comme image d•une verite absolue 
qui est Dieu.l2 
De Mondadon also believes that progress in the argumen-
tation is made by use of the principle of causality, perhaps 
both efficient and exemplary. After presenting his outline 
11 Ibid., 61. 
12 Ibid., 90. 
r 
of the argument, he adds: 
\ Au reste, le passage de l'un a l'autre se 
fait par l'interm6diaire de la causalite, 
~ laquelle on nous renvoie, quand on parle 
de lumi~re intelligible ••• et de ma~tre 
interieur ••• ou plus clairement, quand on 
,- , ,. A 
nomme la verite vie et arne de l'ame 
raisonable,l3 
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And in the passage which follows, he indicates that Augustine 
intended to prove God either as exemplary or as efficient cause. 
From his summary of' the argument quoted at the conclusion 
, 
of the last section, it appears that Portalie understands 
Augustine to proceed by way of causality, probably efficient 
causality. For, he says, the argument must conclude to an 
immutable "source de toute verite." 
Before presenting our own conclusion, we may profitably 
learn the position of one more authority. Gilson frankly 
admits that st. Augustine knew the principle of causality and 
that he made use of it in some places to prove the existence 
of God. 
Sans doute, Augustin a souvent et expressement 
insist( sur le fait que la mutabilite meme 
du monde des corps atteste sa contingence 
et sa dependance h l'egard d'un etre 
necessaire qui est Dieu. On ne peut done 
nier que sa doctrine contienne tous les 
elements necessaires d'une preuve de ce 
13 De Mondadon, 11 De la Connaissance de Soi-m~me 'a la 
Connaissance de Dieu," 155-6. 
r 
I genre et par consequent que cette preuve ,.. 
ne soit compatible avec l'augustinisme 
le plus authentique.l4 
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However, Gilson very justly notes that St. Augustine used 
such proofs rather as pious meditations, as parts of sermons 
or discourses, rather than as proofs properly so called. Where 
he does develop a proper proof, he always passes by way of the 
mind. Why so? Gilson answers: 
, 
Et la raison en est claire. Interrogees 
par nous sur leur nature et leur origine, 
les choses sensibles repondent en effet 
par le spectacle de leur mutabilit~ m~me: 
ce n'est pas nous qui nous sommes faites; il 
faut done les transcender pour atteindre 
" leur cause; or leur cause ne peut etre 
atteinte en tant que cause de ce qu'elles 
ont de changeant et contingent, qui est 
du non ~tre, mais en tant que cause de 
ce qu 1 elles ont de stable, qui est de 
l'~tre. Ce qu'elles ont de stable, c'est 
le nombre, 1 1 ordre et la mesure; or, 
au-dessus de leur nombre se t~ouve celui 
de notre pensee qui les connait; trans-
cendons ce nombre lui-m~me, nous 
I I 
atteignons celui de la Verite qui est 
Dieu.I5 ' 
Therefore, in going by way of the mind, one arrives at 
the truth. Especially are mathematical and metaphysical 
truths apt for the proof, since they are eternal and immutable. 
The only sufficient reason for these truths is God Himself. 
Thus, Gilson evidently concludes that the principle underlying 
14 Gilson, Introduction, 24. 
15 Ibid., 25-6. 
the argument is that of sufficient reason. 
Le point critique de la d~monstration est 
evidemment le dernier, ou Dieu se trouve 
posl comme la seule raison suffisante de 
~ , , " 1 , 16 la verite presente a a pensee. 
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The various opinions given above are useful for several 
reasons. l<'irst, they may serve to make precise our own notions. 
Second, they are the opinions of men well versed in the writings 
of St. Augustine. Third, by their variety they indicate the 
difficulty of the question. It was stated above that the last 
step in St. Augustine's argument is somewhat obscure. The 
very difference of opinion regarding the principle which under-
lies this last step should amply prove that statement. 
In the f'a.ce of such disagreement, it may seem pre-
sumptuous to try to resolve the question. On the other hand, 
it would be unsatisfactory to pass over it without giving any 
personal opinion and tne reasons for holding it. 
In the first place, the conclusion of Descoqs that the 
proof is ·in itself incomplete does not seem to me to be 
justified.l7 I do not say that the argument is valid; it could 
be complete without being valid. And it does appear to be 
complete. Why does St. Augustine proceed by way of thought? 
16 Ibid., 23. 
17 Ii1'"'the next chapter, however, I shall criticize the 
validity of the proof along much the same lines as 
Descoqs does. 
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Is it not to arrive a.t something above our mind, something 
which has such characteristics that neither sensible objects 
nor the mind could produce it~ In proceeding in this way, he 
comes to truth, truth Which is eternal and unchangeable. Does 
he not at once conclude from this that God exists? The 
argumentation, then, appears clear and complete: there must 
exist some being itself eternal and immutable, in order to 
explain metaphysical and mathematical truth. It may be granted 
that St. Augustine does not explicitly state this step, and 
does not explicitly enuntiate his principle. Nevertheless, his 
very manner of' proceeding indicates that he adopted this 
particular way for the purpose of arriving at God as the 
ultimate explanation for truths of this character. Therefore, 
it seems logical to conclude that the argument is complete 
in itself. 
burthermore, the objection that some principle must be 
dragged,!!! to explain the reasoning, in order to give it a 
solid basis, seems unfair and untrue. VVhen St. Augustine 
presented the argument fully, as in the De Libero Arbitrio, he 
evidently intended it to be a systematic proof for the 
existence of God. But, unless some principle demanding that 
God be ~ecessary to explain immutable truth were at least 
implicitly included, the argument would be no argument at all. 
'rhere would be no basis for concluding to God's existence. 
r 
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However, the whole set-up, in which St. Augustine of set 
purpose works toward that truth which is above the intellect 
and whose existence demands the existence of God, clearly 
indicates that the great African Bishop relied on this principle 
in his proof. Therefore, the principle is in the argument 
itself; and need not be shoved into it by its defenders, in 
order to bolster an otherwise incomplete proof. 
For much the swme reasons as those given above, I conclude 
that the principle on which the argument rests is the principle 
of sufficient reason. The argument begins by showing that, in 
man, nothing is superior to the intellect. Why does st. 
Augustine so begin? That he may arrive at the truth, which is 
the object of the intellect. But why does he work toward 
truth? Because truth possesses certain qualities which can be 
explained neither by sensible bodies nor by the intellect. For 
the truths chosen by st. Augustine are mathematical and 
metaphysical truths, truths which are eternal and immutable. 
Why does he select these truths, and, once having proved their 
existence above our intellects, immediately conclude that God 
exists? The answer is that these truths are not the product 
of our mutable intellects. Even though the intellect is the 
highest thing in man, it cannot serve to explain these truths. 
Therefore, God must exist as the only sufficient reason for 
these truths--and a God Who is unchangeable and eternal even 
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as the truths themselves are. Consequently, it seems that the 
proof rests on the principle of sufficient reason.l8 The 
statement of the argument in the De Libero Arbitrio, as 
reproduced in Chapter I, will, it appears, bear out those steps 
which lead to this conclusion. 
In summary, this section was intended to determine the 
principle underlying St. Augustine's "psychological" proof for 
the existence of God. It has been seen that some, like Descoqs, 
maintain that the argument is in itself not complete. We have 
endeavored to show that it is complete, since it is at least 
implicitly based on the principle of sufficient reason - and 
this in the very way in which St. Augustine presented it. 
Others, who hold that the argument is complete, variously 
18 F.J. Thonnard, A.A., Prlcis d'Histoire de la Philosophie, 
Desclee et Cie, Paris, 1946, 214. Fr. Thonnard notes that 
St. Augustine did not favor the proof from efficient 
causality of the sensible world. Then he adds this reason 
for Augustine's procedure: 11 Pourquoi repugne-t-il a monter 
directement du sensible a Dieu? La raison, semble-t-il, 
est que ce chemin ne lui paraissait pas sar. L'ordre des 
choses sensibles en effet, pouvait pleinement s'expliquer, 
h la mani~re des stoiciens et de Plotin, par l'Ame du 
monde, et celle-ci, finie et changeante, n'etaitP'asencore 
Dieu. Augustin la jugeait inutile, sachant par la roi que 
tout a et6 cree par le Verbe; "Ylais rationnellement, il ne 
la jugeait pas absurde; et pour trouver Dieu, il prit, 
semble-t-il, le parti de l'eviter. Or la voie, a ses yeux, 
la plus, efficace, etait le methode platonicienne du 
recueillement et de la purification, le retour par les 
degres de notre vie interieure ou le sommet des v~rit~s 
eternelles p~rmet d'atteindre incontestablement Dieu, seul 
imrnuable et eternel." 
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explain the principle from which the conclusion is drawn. Some 
hold out for exemplary causality; others, for efficient 
causality; others, for the principle of sufficient reason. 
For the reasons given immediately above, we agree with the 
last named conclusion. 
CHAP'.PER V 
0Nrl10LOGISM AND THE PROOF; ITS VALIDITY 
The fact (if granted) that the proof is complete does not 
necessarily prove the validity of the argmnent. Other 
difficulties may be--indeed, have been--urged against this 
proof. The principal of these difficulties is that the 
argument is ontological, in so far as it concludes from our 
thoughts of the eternal truths to their real existence from 
eternity, which fact can only be explained by the real existence 
of God. In his Theodicea, Palumbo lists those who have 
especially attacked the argument: Billot, Mercier, Van der 
Mersch, Loinaz, Mindorff, Cuervo, Balthazar, Ricard, Descoqs. 
Then he observes: "Iuxta auctores praefatos argumentum ideo-
logicum nullum habet valorem ad Dei exsistentiam ostendendam 
et demonstrandam et ontologismum aut innatismum sapit.nl 
Although it is not our purpose here to discuss ontologism 
itself, we may give a definition of what we mean by it. It is 
a system according to which the first and inmediate object of 
1 1:'1ranciscus Antonius Palumbo, Theodicea, Pontif'icium Athenaeum 
Urbanianum, Rome, 1942, 217. 
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the intellect is God Himself, ~simpliciter, Whom one 
immediately apprehends by simple intuition, in which intuition 
one knows all other things. Although there are several 
variations of the system, into which we do not propose to enter, 
this definition is satisfactory for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
With regard to the knowledge of God, the system holds that 
the human mind continually intuits God. Again, this intuition 
is variously explained by the Ontologists. We are concerned 
to give only a general statement of the position, since such a 
statement is adequate for our purposes. 
As a final introductory step, it should be noted that an 
argument may be ontological without by that very fact being 
ontologistic. In other words, there may be a transition from 
the logical order to the real in the argument (ontological), 
and still no confirmation given to and no reliance placed on 
the position which holds that the human mind has a direct 
intuition of God (ontologistic). This distinction is important 
and, we think, legitimate. In speaking of the ontological 
argument ~ simultaneo, Descoqs makes the same distinction: 
Hoc argumentum confundi nequit cum 
Ontologismo, et potest proponi quin ullo 
modo accipiatur intuitio Ontologistarum, 
prouti re vera habetur. Fautores enim 
praesentis argumenti in ordine reali 
mere abstractive stant, tamquam puncto 
a quo, cum dicant ideam Dei infiniti et 
perfecti quam sponte eff'ormant, habere 
valorem objectivum absolutum. Sed 
plerique, saltern hodierni, omnem intuitionem 
Dei respuunt quae esset ratio fundamentalis 
illius objectivitatis ideae. Valor enim 
virtusque a priori rationis ad hoc 
stabiliendum juxta eos sufficiunt.2 
61 
There are varied opinions in this matter. Some authors 
maintain that the argument is ontological; some, that it is 
ontologistic; some, that it is both ontological and ontologistic 
together. Certain non-scholastics and the Ontologists them-
selves,3 of course, accept the argument as ontologistic and 
yet valid. The opinions of a few scholastic authors may well 
be reviewed. 
In the forefront of those who oppose the argument is 
Descoqs. He does not quitewant to call St. Augustine an 
Ontologist, at least in the Doctor's use of this argument; but 
he insinuates all along that the argument is surely ontological 
and probably ontologistic. In regard to the former point, he 
agrees with the observation of Gilson that the proof prepares, 
because it formally implies, the ontological argument of St. 
Anselm.4 He says: 
2 
3 
4 
C'est aussi bien la pensee qui a inspir: 
toute notre critique de cette preuve par 
Descoqs, Praelectiones, I, 609. 
As Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, 
IV, 11; and Malebranche in Recherc~de la VefritJ, III, 7, 2. 
Gilson, Introduction, 28. 
, , 
les idees eternelles: qu'on le veuille ou 
non, l'argument implique le procede ansel-
mien, il se ramene en d~finitive et 
fatalement a l'argument ontologique.5 
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Concerning the question of whether the proof is 
ontologistic, he is not so certain. He admits that it is a 
valid proof for one who holds the Platonic ideas and 
illumination, but doubts that it otherwise has any force at all. 
Although he does not settle the question, he does express 
concern that St. Augustine used such expressions as: "Deus lux 
est in qua omnia cognoscimus, 11 and " ••• in ipsa, quae supra 
mentem est, incommutabili veritate omnia cognoscimus." While. 
leaving the question to others for settlement, Descoqs indicates 
that he believes that the proof is ontologistic as well as 
ontological.6 
Loinaz also opposes the argument on the grounds of 
principium petit, inasmuch as the eternal existence of the 
truths appealed to can only be granted if it is already known 
that God exists. 
Sane omnis veritas, omnia possibilitas 
fundari debet in Deo exsistente; sine quo 
proin neutrum dari poterit. Extra hanc 
hypothesim nee verum nee falsum aderit, 
sed absolutum nihil. Brevi: Maior 
argumenti aprioristice, si Deus non 
5 Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 132. 
6 Ibid. 
supponatur, falsa est. Hinc Deus demon-
stretur ex exsistentibus; quod sufficit.7 
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Mercier notes that, given the possibles, the relations 
which govern them and the truth of these relations are 
independent of time and space. However, the possibles are not 
given, unless it is already supposed that God exists and knows 
them. He summarizes his criticism of the argument: 
En resuml, aucune essence possible n'est 
necessaire en elle-m&le absolument. La 
seule chose necessaire, c'est que, pos~ 
l'existence soit dans la nature, soit dans 
la pensee humaine, d'une essence donnee, 
il se produise entre les el~ments qui la 
constituent, des rapports nicessaires de 
compatibilit' et d'incompatibilite: bref, 
la necessite des possibles est une . 
necessite conditionelle de rapports.B 
He then concludes that the theory according to which God 
would be the sufficient reason of the possibles and of their 
properties "aboutit logiquement )t l'ontologisme."9 
De Mondadon flatly denies that the argument of St. 
Augustine has anything in common with the arguments of St. 
Anselm10 and Descartes, or with the ideological argument of 
7 Loinaz, Praelectiones e Theologia Naturali, 82. 
8 Mercier, Metaphysique 'G6nerale, 44. 
9 Ibid., 49. 
10 In this de Mondadon directly sets himself against J. Martin, 
who maintained that the Augustinian argument was a prelude 
to the Anselmian. Cf. J. Martin, Saint Augustin, 
Librairie J:i'elix Alcan, Paris, 1923, 99-109. 
r 
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Bossuet and Leibniz. He says that those are mistaken (as 
Malebranche and Leibniz) who would find in St. Augustine texts 
to prove their own ontologistic doctrine. However, he adds 
a wise observation: 
Nous pouvons, cependant, reprocher ~ saint 
Augustin de n'avoir pas assez distingu{ au 
net les divers aspects de la vlrite extra-
mentale, accord objectif de la pens~e avec 
son terme, fondements concrets des repre-
sentations abstraites, exemplaire ~ternel 
des ~tres, cause premi~re des actes 
intellectuels. De 1~ ses apparentes 
concessions a 1 1 ontologisme. Platonicien, 
intuitif et orateur, il n'a pas assez 
surveill~, pas assez controle son 
/ 
raisonnement; il court d 1un elan fougueux, 11 on ne le suit plus et on fait fausse route. 
Although Descoqs tries to find an ally in Gilson, it does 
not appear that the latter would go so far as the former. For 
Gilson finds that the proof is complete, being based upon the 
principle of sufficient reason. Moreover, he clearly denies 
that it is ontologistic. 
,.. ,.. 
Mais il apparait de meme coup qu 1 en 
decouvrant ainsi la transcendance de la 
I ~ 
verite, c'est 1 1 existence de Dieu que la ~ .I pensee decouvre, puisque ce qu'elle apercoit 
" au-dessus de l'homme, c 1 est de 1 1 eternel, 
I \ de l'immuable, et du necessaire, c 1 est-a-
dire une realite qui poss~de tous les 
attributs de Dieu lui-m~me. Non pas, sans 
doute, qu'en voyant la v~rite dans sa propre 
pensee, l'~e voie l'essence meme de Dieu. 
Elle n'atteint pas alors le terme dont la 
11 De Mondadon, "De la Connaissance de Soi-m&ne ~ la 
Connaissance de Dieu, 11 156. 
possession lui conf~rerait la b~atitude, 
mais elle voit du moins quel terme il 
\ lui reste a atteindre pour jouir de cette 
b~atitude et entrer dans son repos.l2 
On the other hand, he admits that the proof leads to 
the metaphysical speculation of St. Anselm, but qualifies 
this statement. 
A ~ C'est pourquoi, de meme qu 1 elle prepare 
sous son premier aspect le symbolisme 
medi6val du monde sensible, envisag~e 
\ 
sous ce deux}eme aspect'l elle ouvre la 
voie aux speculations metaphysiques d'un 
saint Anselme, qui cherchent h decouvrir 
1 1 existence de Dieu dans l'idee m~me que 
nous avons de lui. Non qu'il ait developpe 
cette preuve, mais saint Augustin n'en 
avai t po.s moins certainement engage la 
recherche dans une direction qui con-
' duisait no~alement a la preuve de 
Proslogion. 3 
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It is Boyer who defends the argument most often and most 
at length. .B'irst he points out that the larger number of 
authors do not find in St. Augustine the teaching of an immedi-
ate vision of God in our natural knowledge.l4 He goes on to 
say that the two questions are always distinct; hence he 
12 Gilson, Introduction, 21-22. Furthermore, he states on 
page 1~3: "Ainsi done, de quelque point de vue qu' on la 
considere, l'illumination augustinienne ne saurait etre 
/ / / interpretee comme une intuition du contenu des idees 
de Dieu." 
13 Ibid., 28. 
14 Boyer, Essais, 50: 11Le plus grand nombre des auteurs se 
refusent a trouver dans saint Augustin l'enseignement d'une , 
vision immediate de Dieu dans la connaissance naturelle." 
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considers the proof apart from the question of ontologism. 
Nor can anyone correctly argue, he says, (as some,l5 relying on 
the famous passage in the Confessiones,l6 have done) that 
Augustine taught two kinds of knowledge of God: one direct and 
imrnediate, the other mediate in the mirror of the human soul. 
Il n'y a done d'objet immediat pour notre 
1'/ 
esprit que des objets crees. Le plus 
parfait de ces,objets1 celui qui nous 
aide le mieux a conna~tre Dieu, c'est 
l'ime humaine dans l'acte de la charitt.l7 
Again in the schematic presentation of the proof, which 
he gives in his book L'Id6e de Verit~ dans la Philosophie de 
Saint Augustin, Boyer endeavors to show that the proof is not 
ontological. His whole strenuous defense of it is intended to 
prove its validity. He also denies that the argument is 
ontologistic, concluding with these words: 
/ C'est done, croyons-nous, s'egarer que de 
voir dhns la preu~e de Dieu, chez saint 
Augustin, l'expose, soit du systeme de la 
vision en Dieu, comme l'a fait Malebranche, 
soit de l'intuition immediate de Dieu, 
telle que l'ont comgrise les ontologistes 
du dernier si~cle.l 
15 Boyer himself names Ambrosius Victor, :Malebranche, and 
Hessen. 
16 Confesaiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742: "Intravi, et vidi 
qualicumque oculo animae meae, supra eundem oculum animae 
meae supra mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem ••• " 
17 Boyer, Essa~a, 90. 
18 Boyer, L'Idee, 70-71. 
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Along with these defenders of St. Augustine's proof may 
be named Hontheim, who in his Institutiones Theodicaeae gives 
a long defense,l9 Bossuet,20 Fenelon,21 Leibniz,22 Kleutgen,23 
Sertillanges,24 Garrigou-Lagrange,25 and others. They are 
listed here that we may see how great is the controversy on 
this matter. 
In giving my own opinion on this difficult question, I 
should like to call attention to the distinction made in the 
introductory remarks of this chapter. 'fhe proof may be 
ontological (that is, involve an illegitimate jump from the 
ideal to the real order) without being ontologistic (that is, 
without implying a direct vision of God). For it seems to me 
that the proof is ontological objectively, and yet not 
ontologistic. 
To take up the latter problem first, it seems well to 
remark with de Mondadon that St. Augustine was not always 
careful to guard his remarks in such a way as to prevent 
19 Joseph Hontheim, S.J., Institutiones Theodicaeae, Herder,' 
Friburg, 1893, 128-139. So on 132: "Neque tamen cum 
quibusdam exsistimandum est ex mente s. Augustini ipsum 
Deum esse objectum, quod intelligentia nostra directe 
contemplatur, quando vera pronuntiat." 
20 Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-meme, IV, 5. 
21 Traitl de l 1Eirstenee-ae-oieu, I, 2, 50; II, 3, 49. 
22 Nouveaui:Essais sur l'Elltenaement Humain, IV, 11. 
23 Phi1osophie SchoiiStique, IV, 11, 4. 
24 "L'Idee de Dieu et 1a V~rite," in Revue Thomiste, sept., 
1940. 
25 Dieu, 296-302. 
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misunderstanding. We may cite two outstanding examples which 
taken together surely allow misinterpretation. Augustine says 
that he sees the unchangeable light above his intellect, and 
again identifies this light with God. In the Conf'essiones, he 
writes: 11 Intravi, et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra 
eundem oculum animae meae supra mentem meam, lucem incom-
mutabilem."26 And in the De Vera Religione: "Nee jam illud 
ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem 
animam sit, Deum esse.rr27 That this is dangerous language may 
be granted; that it is a proof' that the argument is ontologistic 
need not be granted. 
The first fact to be considered is this: St. Augustine 
regularly calls for faith in God's existence, even when he is 
about to prove the same point by reason. In the De Vera 
Religione, the sections leading up to the proof discuss what 
faith has to tell us about the existence and nature of God. In 
the De Libero Arbitrio, at the outset he asks: 11Illud saltern 
tibi certum est, Deum esse"; and Evodius replies: "Etiam hoc 
non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo.n28 But it is 
at once evident that, where there is faith, there is no room 
for an immediate vision of God, which would exclude faith. 
26 
27 
28 
Conf'essiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742. 
De Vera Reiigione, 31, 57; PL 34, 147. 
De LIOero Ar itrio, II~ 2, 5; PL 32, 1242. 
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Ontologists such as Malebranche may have faith in revelation 
and mysteries, but they cannot logically have faith in the 
existence of God. It is faith in precisely this fact which 
Augustine demands at the outset of his argument. Moreover, the 
question of the respective positions of faith and reason is so 
prominent in St. Augustine thet it can hardly be argued that 
he would be unaware of the inconsistency of demanding faith in 
the existence of that which we intuit. Therefore, in his very 
demand for faith the great Doctor shows how far opposed he is 
to ontologiam. 
Secondly, the principle on which the philosophical proof 
is baaed is, as we have endeavored to prove, the principle of 
sufficient reason. It is granted that in pious and rhetorical 
passages St. Augustine does not speak with philosophical 
precision, ~nd so may seem to hold a direct intuition of God. 
Nevertheless, in the discussion in the De Libero Arbitrio, he 
argues by psychological method to those truths of which God is 
the sole sufficient reason. He does not argue: "We have a 
direct vision of God; therefore we know that He exists." His 
laborious process rather excludes this direct vision. The 
argumentation is not to the psychological "fact" that we 
directly intuit God. It is rather to the fact that we recognize 
above our minds eternal and immutable truths; the changeable 
mind cannot be the explanation of these truths; therefore, God 
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must exist as the only reason sufficient to explain their 
existence. Again, then, we must conclude that the argument is 
not ontologistic. 
Finally, St. Augustine in the De Trinitate endeavors to 
explain st. Paul's words: 11 We see now through a glass in a dark 
manner: but then face to face.n29 He realizes that the true 
explanation can only be that God is seen, not directly, but in 
something which "reflects" Him. He seeks those things which 
may provide the best reflection. 
Quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum, si 
quaeramus, profecto illud occurrit, quod 
in speculo nisi imago cernitur. Hoc ergo 
facere conati sumus, ut per imaginem hanc 
quod nos sumus, videremus utcumque a quo 
facti sumus, tamquam per speculum.30 
This is the reason why it may be said that Augustine, 
while employing elements of the classical proofs for God's 
existence, really considered them all part of his one proo~. 
He is seeking the mirror in which he may see God. Working ~rom 
sensible creatures, he arrives at God by means of the argument 
from causality, by means of the order in the universe, etc. 
But the mirror in which he best sees God is the human soul 
itself. As Boyer summarizes it, 
Il n•y a done d'objet imnH~diat pour notre 
29 I Corinthians, 13/12. 
30 De Trinitate, XV, 8, 14; PL 42, 1067. 
, / 
esprit que des objets crees. Le plus 
parfait de ces,objets~ celui qui nous 
aide le mieux a conna~tre Dieu, c'est 
l'ame humaine dans l'acte de la charit~.31 
It has been shown that this is the route which st. 
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Augustine follows in the argument as we have presented it from 
his works. However, such a route--long and slow and tedious--
is entirely unnecessary if one bas an immediate vision of God. 
The words of St. Paul, moreover, are not explained if we see 
"face to face" here below, even though in a less perfect manner 
than we shall see God in heaven. Again, it appears that we 
must come to the same conclusion; namely, that the argument 
is not ontologistic. 
There remains, however, the other question of whether or 
not the proof is ontological. We have noted the divergence of 
opinion in this matter. I have stated that, in my opinion, 
the proof ~ ontological. It is time now to give the reasons 
for that opinion. 
In the course of his argument, St. augustine proceeds from 
inanimate creatures, to brutes, to rational beings. He shows 
that the highest thing in man is his reason. He proves that, 
above reason, there exist eternal and immutable truths. These 
truths, he says, are above reason because reason realizes that 
31 Boyer, Essais, 90. 
r 
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it does not judge them, but judges according to them; and 
because the mutable intellect cannot produce or explain 
immutable truth. He concludes that God exists. \Ve have shown 
that this conclusion must rest on the fact that God alone is 
the sufficient reason to explain the existence of these truths. 
rt seems to me that this procedure involves a leap from the 
logical order to the real.32 
For whence come these truths, with their characteristics 
of universality, eternity, and immutability? How can it be 
said that they exist above our intellects? If these truths are 
taken materially, as abstracted from the real order by the 
intellect, they do not require the existence of God as their 
32 In Augustine's own system this is not necessarily true. If 
he did not hold abstraction in the Thomistic sense, the 
proof would not be ontological for him. This point is 
taken up later. For the presen~c~Thonnard, Precis 
d'Histoire de la Philosophie, 214-215: 11Mais ce passage 
obligatoireparnotre esprit suscite une objection contre , 
la valeur de la demonstration augustinienne: en s'appuyant 
sur le caractere de nos id~es, n'est-elle pas un passage 
ill~gitime du logique-iu r~el? ••• mais saint Augustin 
echappe \ l'objection, car il ne se base aucunement sur 
nos id~es ab~traites, ignorant totalement l'abstraction. 
Les v~ri tes etei·nelles expriment pour lui le fait de 
notre vie intellectuelle saisi par l'intuition-Qe la 
conscience, avec toutes ses richesses d'~tre, resumant 
pour ainsi dire et concentrant en soi la realite des 
degres inferieurs qu'elle juge et regle. Le~assage 
ill~gitime du logique au rlel est done bien evite et 
la preuve augustinienne, sans gtre parfaitement reductible 
aux cadres thomistes, garde sa pleine valeur de demonstra-
tion rationnelle." Although not wholly agreeing with 
this reasoning, we think it worthy of note here. 
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sufficient reason. For, given the abstractive power of the 
intellect, given the ess€nces of finite things which actually 
are particular, temporal, mutable, and contingent, one can 
abstract from individuating notes and from real existence. Then 
these essences are, in their ideal ~, universal, eternal, 
immutable, and necessary. But they do not require the eternal 
and immutable God as the sufficient reason for their existence. 
It is true, as Descoqs points out and as certain defenders of 
the a_rgument attempt to do, that the proof' may be reduced to 
the argument from contingency (if' these truths are taken as 
contingent essences abstracted from contingent existing beings), 
or to the argument from the grades of being (if these truths 
are taken in themselves as determined, finite realities). So 
reduced it is a valid argument. However, it seems that st. 
Augustine himself does not argue in this way. 
On the other hand, if these truths are taken formally--
that is, only in the ideal and intelligible order--and if the 
argument is taken as complete in itself, there seems to be an 
illegitimate transfer from the ideal to the real order. For 
these truths necessarily imply a relation to some mind, either 
human or divine. But since, by hypothesis, it is not yet 
certain that God exists, then such truths imply a relation only 
to the human intellect and have their sufficient reason in 
our intellect and in things. If they exist from eternity, then 
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there must be a mind knowing them from eternity. But the 
eternity of these truths is acquired only by the abstraction 
made from really existing things by the human mind, under the 
supposition that we do not yet know whether or not God exists. 
Hence, if one concludes from this truth, as abstracted by the 
hmnan intellect and therefore in the ideal order only, to the 
real existence of God, one falls into the ontological error. 
This the argument, if taken in itself, seems to do. And it has 
been demonstrated elsewhere that the argument should be taken 
as complete in itself. 
It might be added that, granted the existence of God 
proved in some other way, the argument can be used to demon-
strate that eternal truths have only in God the sufficient 
reason for their existence. However, it is precisely this 
supposition which one arguing to the existence of God cannot 
make. 
For the conclusion of this section, a short summary is in 
order. It has been shown that there has been controversy on 
two points concerning this proof. Some have held that the 
argument is ontologistic, that St. Augustine must have taught 
that we have a direct vision of God. They have adduced texts 
to prove this point. In reply, we have endeavored to show 
that Augustine's thought is not ontologistic, although his 
words are somewhat careless at times. Specifically, we have 
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tried to prove that this proof is not ontologistic. 
- . 
Secondly, some authors defend the validity of the proof, 
while others say that, if taken as a separate proof, it is an 
ontological argument. After giving several opinions on both 
sides, we attempted to demonstrate that the proof is onto-
logical. It follows, of course, that the proof is--again in 
my opinion--invalid.33 
33 Of. Palumbo, 'rheodicea, 213-222. The author gives an 
admirable summary of the proof, the position and reasons 
of both those who defend the argument and those who oppose 
it. I have drawn on him heavily for the last part of 
this section. 
CHAPTER VI 
DEPENDENCE ON THE DOCTRINE O!t' ILLUMINATION 
Having concluded our discussion of' the validity of St. 
Augustine's argument, we might perhaps logically proceed at once 
to some remarks on the spirit animating it. However, there is 
another question so closely connected with this proof that we 
cannot overlook it. Does the proof depend on the Augustinian 
doctrine of illumination? Are the two distinct? These are the 
questions which underlie the discussion in this chapter. 
Briefly, the doctrine of illumination which St. Augustine 
proposed is this: in order to know anything, our human intellect 
must receive a mysterious influence from God, an illumination of 
some sort, in the light of which it knows the truth. Time and 
again Augustine explains the origin of our ideas and our 
intellectual knowledge in this way. After he had rejected the 
Neoplatonic theory of reminiscence, he developed this theory of 
his own, often using metaphors to bring out his meaning. God is 
the sun of the soul,l its interior master,2 the light in which 
1 Soliloquiorum Libri Duo, I, 8, 15; PL 32, 877: "Ergo et illa 
quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisquis intelligit, 
verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est ea 
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we see all things.3 In the De Civitate Dei, the Word is called 
the light of the soul, even for the acquisition of natural 
knowledge, which Augustine is there discussing.4 
Now it must be admitted that this doctrine is interpreted 
in several different ways. Complete discussion of the doctrine 
lies outside the scope of this paper. However, some of the 
interpretations will be presented. A brief refutation will be 
made of some; the reasons for adopting the interpretation 
followed will be stated. 
First, there is the pantheistic interpretation, which 
would make st. Augustine an Averroist. According to this 
non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi sole illustrentur." 
2 De Magistro, 12, 40; PL 32, 1217: neum vero de iis agitur 
quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione, 
ea quidem loquimur quae praesentia contuemur in illa 
interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior, 
illustratur et furitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si 
et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt; novit quod 
dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc 
quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem, docetur enim non 
verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente, 
manifestis. 11 
3 De Genesi ad Litteram, XII, 31, 59; PL 34, 479: "Aliud 
autem est IPsum lumen quo illustratur anima ut omnia vel 
in se vel in illo veraciter intellects conspiciat." 
4 De Civitate Dei, X, 2; PL 41, 2'79: "In qua differentia 
Sit!s ostenditur, animam rationalem vel intellectualem, 
qualis erat in Joanne, sibi lumen esse non posse, sed 
alterius veri luminis participatione lucere. Hoc et ipse 
Joannes fatetur, ubi ei perhibens testimonium dicit: 'Nos 
omnes de plenitudine ejus accepimus.'" This is given as a 
comment on the opening verses of the Gospel according to 
st. John. 
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interpretation, God, as universal intellect, would see the 
truth in us and we in Him. Since Augustine rejects eternal 
creation (as in the De Civitate Dei)5 and yet holds creation 
~ nihilo (as in the De Vera Religione),6 a pantheistic 
explanation of his system is impossible. 
Malebranche, J:t,enelon, and Bossuet, among others, have put 
an ontologistic interpretation on the doctrine of illumination.7 
They say that Augustine taught that our soul sees God Himself 
and in Him the divine ideas. However, as we have already shown 
in the previous chapter, St. Augustine clearly rejected any 
direct vision of God. The very metaphors he used in exposing 
his system indicate, not that it is God Himself \¥ho is seen, 
but rather t~at other things are known because of some influence 
of God on the human soul. Portalie sums up the case against 
a position which we shall not again refute at length: 
D'apr~s saint Augustin, Dieu soleil de 
ltftme, n'apparaft jamais comme un objet 
que nous voyons, mais comme un agent qui 
produit en notre ~e ce par quoi nous 
pouvons connaftre:a-
A third interpretation is offered by the scholastic 
5 De Civitate Dei, X, 31; PL 41, 311-312; and XI, 6, PL 41, 
322: "Cum tempore autem factus est mundus." 
6 De Vera Religione, 18, 35, PL 04, 137: "Unde fecit? Ex 
nib!'I'O:"" 
7 Places cited in previous chapter. 
8 Portalie, "Saint Augustin, 11 DTC, I, 2335. In this section 
we have borrowed much f'rom tEIS excellent article. 
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school, proposed by such men as Zigliari, Franzelin, and 
Lepidi.9 According to them, God is the light of the intellect 
inasmuch as He is its creative cause and the source'and exemplar 
of all truth. rrhis interpretation of St. Augustine seems 
insufficient. In the first place, although the Bishop of 
Hippo would certainly accept the two statements, he said more 
than they say. He was striving constantly for an explanation 
of the problem of knowledge. Merely to maintain that God 
created the human intellect and that He is the source of truth, 
does not solve this problem. How does the human mind arrive at 
the truth? That is what he wanted to explain. And he intro-
duced his doctrine of illumination precisely in order to provide 
the answer to this further question. The texts already cited--
. 
and this is the second point--indicate that God, in addition to 
creating our intellect, must continually illuminate it that it 
may know the truth. Hence, if we may believe that St. Augustine 
offered any solution to the problem of knowledge, it seems that 
9 Zigliari in Della Luce Intellectuale, I, 11-13; Franzelin in 
De Deo Uno, 140-14s;-Lepid1 in J)e Ontologismo, 192-225. 
Boyer-in-Eis Essais admits that-xugustine and Aristotle 
follow different routes, but maintains that, after all, they 
are not so very far apart in the end result. So p. 163: 
"Vraimer;t quelque di verses qu' a).ent ~te les voies parcourues, 
la difference au point d'arrivee est minima, s'il y en a 
une ••• 11 Cf. the whole chapter on "Saint ·J:homas et Saint 
Augustin." Descoqst criticism of' Boyer for attempting to 
reconcile St. ~ugustine and St. Thomas in this matter 
(Praelectiones, I, 557-559), while perhaps 'harsh, seems 
to me to be sound. 
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we must reject this interpz·etation as inadequate. 
A final interpretation is offered here. It is that of 
Portali~ and the one followed in this discussion. It maintains 
that the action of God in our intellectual knowledge does not 
consist in His showing Himself to us, but in producing in our 
minds an image of the truth. 
On peut la formuler ainsi: Notre hle ne peut 
atteindre a la verite intellectuelle, sans 
une influence mysterieuse de Dieu, ne 
consistant point a se montrer lui-meme a 
nous (objective), mais ~ produire (effective) 
Dans notre ~e comme une image de ces 
I I I 
verites qui determine notre connaissance. 
En langage scolastique, le role que les 
aristoteliciens attribuent a l•intellect 
agent qui produit les species impressae, 
ce systeme l'attribue a Dieu: Lui, le 
maitre, il parlerait a l'ame, en ce sens 
qu'il imprimerait cette representation 
des vlri t~s e'ternell es qui serai t la / 
cause de notre connaissance. Les idees 
ne seraient pas inn6es comme dans lea 
anges, mais successivement produites dans l'~e qui les conna1trait en elle-mgme.lO 
Does this proof for the existence of God have an essential 
dependence on St. Augustine's theory of illumination as 
interpreted above? Descoqs seems to maintain such an essential 
dependence. For, in his sketch of the proof, he explains 
that st. Augustine argued directly from the illumination of the 
soul by God to the existence of God. 
10 I Portalie, nsaint Augustin,n DTC, I, 2336. 
/ Cette rapidite avec laquelle s. Augustin 
expose l'essentiel de sa preuve, montre 
qu'il la tient pour 6vidente: et d'ailleurs 
est-ce bien une preuve, si par ce mot on 
I 
entend une deduction logique qui nous conduit 
a la certitude? Si la pensee humaine est 
sans cease sous l'action de la lumi~re 
divine, comme le suppose s. Augustin, et 
si, sans elle,-elle ne peUt rien conna1tre, 
tout homme, par le fait m~me qu 1 il m~ne 
une vie raisonnable, est en contact ~troit 
avec Dieu, il en a dej~ une connaissance 
implicite. Il lui suffira done de re-
fl{chir sur lui-meme, sur son activite 
intellectuelle, pour prendre aussit8t 
conscience de sa dependance a l'egard de 
la v6rite divine et done de l'existence de 
cette verite sans laquelle il ne pourrait 
.1\ 
meme pas penser. Ainsi 1 1 existence de 
Dieu nous est plutSt livree par une analyse 
pscyhologique gue par un veritable 
raisonnement.li 
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Gilson agrees that the two--this proof and illumination--
are essentially connected in St. Augustine. He gives his 
reason: 
/ / ' Il est d'abord evident par ce qui precede 
[an outline of the proof] que 1 'on ne 
saurait distinguer chez saint Augustin le 
\ probleme de l'existence de Dieu du 
' probleme. de la connaissance; c'est une 
seule et meme question de savoir co~ent 
nous concevons la verite et de connaitre 
/ / l'existence de la Verite, aussi la preuve 
s'accomplit-elle toute entiere a l'interieur 
de la pensee, sans que la considlration de 
1 1 ordre sensible doive obligatoirement 
intervenir.l2 
11 Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131. 
12 Gilson, Introduction, 23-24. 
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While not stating his opi~ion precisely about this 
, 
proof, Portalie, seems to come to the same conclusion. For he 
says that the question of illumination is of the first 
importance in St. Augustine, 11 especially because of the role 
which this theory plays in the augustinian system: it is not 
an isolated problem, it is a part, an aspect, of the great 
general problem of our dependence upon God.ul3 In other words, 
he would favor the opinion upholding the essential connection 
of the two questions. 
Boyer, on the other hand, maintains that the two are 
distinct. In his consideration of the proof, he deliberately 
separates the one question from the other, observing that, 
although one may cast light on the other, they should be 
treated separately. 
Afin de dtcrire avec exactitude la mani~re 
dont saint Augustin a prouve Dieu, il faut 
d;gager constamment cette question de 
plusieurs autres qui l'accompagnent 
d'ordinaire dans les textes. Etablir que 
Dieu est, ce n'est pas expliquer comment 
nous connaissons Dieu, ni comment il agit 
sur notre intelligence, ni quel rapport 
il soutient avec les autres ~tres, ni 
meme comment il est. Les th~ories de la 
vision de Dieu, de l'illumination, de la 
participation, de l'essence divine, se 
rencontrent souvent, soit toutes ensemble 
13 Portali6', "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2334: " ••• surtout 1 
cause du r~le que joue cette~eorie ·dans le systeme· 
augustinien: ce n'est pas un probleme isol{, c'est une 
partie, un aspect du grand probleme general de notre 
dlpendance de Dieu." 
soit l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles, dans 
"' la meme page que la preuve de l'existence 
de Dieu. Parce qu'elles sont connexes, on 
est tente de les confondre. Sans doute, 
elles s'eclairent l'une l'autre, mais 
/ I 
seulement quand chacune a ete rendue 
lumineuse pour sa part. Sinon, la synth~se \ ~ . 
est trouble, et le systeme encombre de 
difficul tes .14 
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This sampling of opinions should indicate that this point 
too is as much controverted as are the other questions concerned 
with this proof. Dut what conclusions may be drawn from the 
argument itself? 
In the first place, it should be noted that St. Augustine 
himself does not explicitly introduce his theory of illumination 
into the argument. He begins the proof in the De Libero 
Arbitrio by demonstrating that the human mind is capable of 
knowing truth. 
Quare prius abs te quaere, ut de mani-
festissimis capiamus exordium; utrum tu 
ipse sis. An tu fortasse metuis, ne in 
hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique 
si non esses, falli omnino non posses?l5 
But note that he makes no appeal to the doctrine of illumination 
to establish this fact. Again, he arrives at the point where 
14 Boyer, L'Id6e, 49. Cf. also Essais, 51-53: "Cornme toutefois 
les deux questions sont de soi distinctes, nous ne 
considererons directement dans ces pages que la preuve de 
Dieu, et nous negligerons les controverses qui portent 
d'emblee sur l'illumination." 
15 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243. 
84 
the mind recognizes eternal truth above itself. How does the 
mind get at this truth? Augustine does not answer the question 
here. He states it as a fact of psychological experience: "It 
is sufficiently clear that above our mind there is a law which 
is ~alled truth.ul6 Nor in any other place in his proof does 
he explicitly advance his answer to the problem of knowledge. 
However, it should be noted that, in the second place, 
St. Augustine must have used his doctrine implicitly; that is, 
he presumed its validity throughout his proof. I As Portalie 
says, illumination is not an isolated doctrine; it runs through 
all the speculations of the great Doctor. A priori, we might 
say that he would not abandon it in this particular demon-
stration. Of course, he could not mention it explicitly, 
because to say that God illumines our intellect is to presume 
what is to be proved; namely, that God exists. However, when we 
examine the proof, we see that Augustine chose to proceed by 
way of the mind, first demonstrating briefly the ability of the 
mind to know truth. He is not concerned here to explain how 
the mind gets at the truth; but it seems certain that, if 
questioned, he would give the answer he so often gave else-
where--his doctrine of' illumination. Since the whole proof 
proceeds through the mind to get at something above the mind, 
16 ~Vera Religione, 30, 56; PL 34, 147. 
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since this something above the mind is truth, since the mind 
knows this truth--since all this is so, it seems clear!_ 
posteriori that St. Augustine implicitly employed his illumi-
nation theory even in the proof for the existence of God. 
It must be admitted, nevertheless, that even this implicit 
use of the theory does not as yet prove any essential dependence 
of the proof upon it. Whether there is such an essential 
connection is a further question. 
But first let us make one point clear. Descoqs implies 
that st. Augustine argued from his theory of illumination to 
the existence of God. According to Descoqs, Augustine says 
that every man has an implicit knowledge of God; by reflection 
on his own intellectual activity he learns of his dependence 
upon the divine truth and then of the existence of this truth 
without which he would not even be able to think. Why do we 
know truth and justice? Because the divine truth and justice 
illumine us.l7 In this way Descoqs seems to argue that 
Augustine used his very doctrine of illumination to prove the 
existence of God. vVhether or not this is really the sense of 
Descoqs' words, the fact clearly stands that such a procedure 
would be invalid. It would be a vicious circle to advance' a 
17 Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131: "Comment discerner ce 
qui est Juste de ce qui ne l'est pas, si la justice infinie 
ne nous 'claire?" 
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theory of knowledge which implies the existence of God, and 
then to demonstrate the existence of God by means of this 
theory. However, there is no evidence that St. Augustine 
proceeds in this way. He first es-tablishes the ability of the 
mind to grasp truth, independently of any theory as to how the 
mind grasps it. Then, again independently of any theory, he 
appeals to the fact that the mind recognizes immutable truth 
above itself. Finally, he shows that God must exist if this 
truth exists. In the whole procedure, be it noted, he argues 
to and from facts, but not from his theory of illumination. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is, in Augustine's 
mind and method, an essential connection of this proof for the 
existence of God and the solution of the problem of knowledge 
by illumination. It was pointed out in the previous chapter 
that this proof is ontological if taken as a separate argument. 
Whereas Augustine argues from the existence of immutable and 
eternal truth to the existence of God as--so we think--the 
sufficient reason for this truth; in a Thomistic explanation 
the theory of abstraction would account for the immutability, 
eternity, and universality of truth, given sensible things and 
the abstractive power of the mind. For it was noted that, if 
one argued from the existence of' truth as abstracted by the 
mind and so in the ideal order, to the real existence of God, 
then one would fall into the ontological error. It appeared 
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that, objectively, Augustine had fallen into this error. 
However, his method seems to indicate that he did not wish to 
take this truth ~ abstracted, and yet regarded his proof as 
complete in itself. If in his solution to the problem of 
knowledge there is no abstractive process by which truths in 
the ideal order would be universal and immutable; if the only 
explanation is that these truths must have God as the sufficient 
reason for their universality and iwnutability; in that 
hypothesis the argument would be valid. Therefore, if St. 
Augustine assumed in his proof the validity of his illumination 
theory, a theo1~y in which there would be no abstraction in the 
Thomistic sense;l8 then for him the argwnent would be valid. 
No other explanation than this latter (barring simple error on 
Augustine's part) seems adequate. Consequently, both to his 
mind and in fact the proof has an essential dependence on the 
doctrine of' illumination.l9 
18 Boyer, Essais, ch. 5 and 6, attempts to show that Augustine 
actually did hold abstraction in the Thomistic sense, or at 
least that this is not incompatible with his doctrine. 
Descoqs remarks: " ••• la these du P. Boyer sur le thomisme 
de s. Augustin et le possibilite de ramener sa theorie de la 
connaissance ~ l 1 abstraction aristotelico-thomiste, est de 
plus en plus battue en br'hche." (Praelectiones, I, 559.) 
19 Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 132-133: flpour qui adopte la 
metaphysique platonicienne du monde des intelligibles et des 
idees, ou pour qui admet deja Dieu et l'illumination du 
Verbe, une telle maniere de voir vaut sans doute; mais pour 
qui n'admet pas cette met~hysique des idees, ou ne tient 
pas encore Dieu, il est bien evident que la preuve qui 
~ ~ 
s'y appuie n'a plus la meme force, si meme elle en conserve 
aucune." 
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Before concluding this chapter, it might be well to 
remark with Portalie that st. Augustine's doctrine of illumi-
nation is still a free theological opinion, which may be used 
to solve the problem of knowledge. st~ Thomas treated it with 
respect. Suarez comrnented that in so obscure a matter liberty 
remains for the theologian. Illustrious men, particularly of 
the school of st. Bonaventure, have defended it. Although it 
does not seem even probable philosophically today, it has had 
considerable historical importance. 
In summary, these points may be set down. The theory of 
illumination has been variously interpreted. The interpretation 
here followed is that which explains God's influence in intel-
lectual knowledge as the production of an image of the truth 
in the human mind. Although the question of the essential 
connection of this proof with the doctrine of illumination is 
controverted, this conclusion seems valid from a study of the 
proof itself: St. Augustine does not argue from his theory to 
the existence of God, but in his method there is an essential 
connection between the two. 
CF~TER VII 
THE SPIRIT OF THE PROOF 
Although the logical steps and principles of St. 
Augustine's proof have been sufficiently analyzed, there remain 
to be discussed certain characteristics or features of this 
proof which indicate the spirit in which it was conceived and 
set down. 
One characteristic stroke of St. Augustine's pen is the 
discursive nature of the argument. In the first chapter a 
complete account of the proof and the parts of the De Libero 
Arbitrio preceding it was set down. There were seen all the 
nuances, the short halts, the rhetorical flourishes, in which 
st. Augustine seemed to take delight. There is the step-by-step 
procedure from inanimate things all the way up to the intellec-
tual soul and above. There is the slow build-up, beginning 
with a demand for faith in God's existence and a demonstration 
of the ability of the mind to attain truth.l There is the 
questioning method and a concretiz~ng of the problem, the 
effective practical method of the apologist. There is the pause 
1 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 2-3, 5-7; PL 32, 1242-1244. 
89 
90 
to praise Wisdom and to urge Evodius to embrace it--and this in 
flowing rhetoric.2 There is all the sinuousness of a majestic 
river flowing to its outlet. In fact, the whole proof is 
inserted into a discussion of free will and the origin of evil. 
Not for Augustine the short, sharp strokes of the scholastic 
syllogism, not even in this work where he deliberately sets 
himself to demonstrate by reason the existence of God. De 
Mondadon gives a good description of this method: 
I Soit qu'il la developpe en un dialogue avec 
son ami Evodius ••• a travers l'entrecroisement 
des reflexions, soit qu'il la resserre ••• 
' I en quelques phrases d'une brievete musculeuse 
et comme fremissant.e, jamais il ne manque 
d'y mettre une richesse de nuances que ne 
laisserait point soupgonner le lucide 
raccourci de la forme scolastique.3 
Moreover, in presentations of the proof in other works, 
st. Augustine becomes even more rhetorical. In the Confessi-
~,4 which we will have occasion to quote below, in sermons 
and discourses, or in the De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII,5 
he demonstrates that style which is the wonder and despair of 
those who read him. For example: 
Omne quod est, aut eodem modo semper est, 
aut non. Et omnia anima omni corpore 
melior est. Melius est enim omne quod 
2 Ibid., II, 13-14, 35-38; PL 32, 1260-1262. 
3 JelMondadon, "De la Connaissance de Soi-m~me de la 
Connaissance de Dieu," 148. 
4 Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742. 
5 De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28-29; and 
q7 54; PL 40, 38. 
vivificat, quam id quod vivificatur: corpus 
autem ab anima vivificari, non a corpore 
animam nemo ambigit. ~od autem corpus non 
est, et tamen a1 iquid est, aut anima est, 
aut ea melius aliquid. Deterius enim omni 
corpore nihil est: quia et si materiam quia 
dixerit, unde ipsum corpus fit; recte, 
quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur ••• 
Si quid enim esset medium, aut vivificaretur 
ab anima, aut vivificaret animam, aut 
neutrum: aut vivificaret corpus aut vivi-
ficaretur a corpore aut neutrum.6 
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Perhaps even more characteristic of St. Augustine's 
method is the psychological approach here employed. .~.·he proof 
begins with a demonstration of the mind's capacity for truth., 
The progress is ever upwards toward the soul. Then comes an 
analysis of the psychological fact: the mind recognizes above 
itself the immutable law of Truth. So studiously does he 
employ the method in this proof--as should be clear from the 
account given--that both J. Martin and Descoqs, to name two, 
maintain that the argun1ent is rather an analysis of our implicit 
knowledge of God than a proper demonstration. Influenced 
perhaps by his Neoplatonic background, Augustine always favored 
6 
7 
De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q.54; PL 40, 38. 
'J.'" Martin, Saint Au~ustin, lol: "Tout, pour saint Augustin, 
se ramene a ce poin fondamental: l'intelligence hunlaine 
a primitivement une connaissance de Dieu, totale et tr~s 
confuse ••• et, pour ne pas sortir du sujet, elle verifie 
que, prouver l'existence de Dieu, c'est percevoir avec 
/ / ' quelque clarte ce que l•on savait deja, mais trop 
confusement." - Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131: 11Ainsi 
l'existence de Dieu nous est plut8t livree par une analyse 
psychologique que par un veritable raisonnement." 
92 
such an approach, an approach as modern as television. And in 
this sort of study he was a master. Portalie says of him: 
Dans l'etude de l'~e, Augustin est plus 
heureux que dans son angelologie trop 
pen~tree de neoplatonisme. Ici il semble 
vivre dans son domaine: un don exquis 
d'observation int~rieure et d'analyse 
penE!trante lui ;>ermet de dE!crire avec une 
saisissante precision les phenom~nes les 
plus d~licats de notre vie intime.8 
Some elements in the proof which rise from this background 
of Neoplatonism may be indica ted. .L1he most noticeable is the 
very principle which Augustine employed. He asked Evodius: 
"Are you willing to admit that God exists if I can prove to 
you th&t there exists something superior to the human 
intellect?"9 Now this line of attack is directly out of 
Plotinus, as Augustine himself says in the De Civitate Dei. 
Dicit ergo ille magnus Platonicus, animam 
rationalem (sive potius intellectualis 
dicenda sit, ex quo genere etiam imrnor-
talium beatorumque animas esse intelligit, 
quos in coelestibus sedibus habitare non 
dubitat) non habere supra se naturam nisi 
Dei, qui fabrica8us est mundum, a quo et 
ipsa facta est.l 
Another indication of his philosophical background is 
8 Portalie, "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2356-2357. 
9 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 6, l~PL 32, 1248: "Quid si 
iriquid invenire potuerimus, quod non solum esse non dubites, 
sed eti~~ ipsa nostra ratione praestantius? dubitabisne 
illud quidquid est, Deum dicere?" 
10 De Civitate Dei, X, 2; PL 41, 279-280. 
93 
found in his mode of advancing step by step through the various 
grades of being. He wishes to transcend the sensible order, 
but in the longest expose of his proof he feels obliged to do 
so gradually. As Boyer and Descoqs remark, once he has traveled 
this route, he need not traverse all the steps again. However, 
when he follows the itinerary from start to finish in such a 
way that Evodius may follow him, he takes one step at a time 
to arrive at the truth above our intellect. This procedure 
through the "degrees of being" may also be called Platonic. 
Again, the effort to pass from things to their ideas, 
f.rom the sensible to the intelligible, is distinctive of St. 
Augustine. Gilson observes that his normal route is from the 
exterior world to the soul, and from the soul to God.ll One 
reason for this is undoubtedly the prominence of ideas in 
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy. Another reason is the 
fact that Augustine had at one time conceived of God in a 
material way, as the Confessiones abundantly testify. Now he 
wishes to prove the spirituality of God by placing him clearly 
above the intelligibles.l2 And it may be added that his 
concern to ea.tablish the mind's ability. to grasp truth, at the 
very outset, grows out of his own Manichaean difficulties. For 
11 Gilson, Introduction, 24: " ••• alors m~me qu' elle part du 
monde ext~rieur, ltitin6raire normal d'une preuve augus-
tinienne va done du monde ~ l•Bme et de l'rune a Dieu." 
12 Cf. fhonnard 1 s observation, given in Chapter IV, p. 57. 
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the Manichaeans denied that man can know anything with 
certainty. These more or less autobiographical marks, then, are 
also characteristic. 
Something which he did not learn from his early philo-
sophical training, but which he garnered from his own hard 
. 
experience, is also evident in the proof. It is the insistence 
on faith, coming from belief in authority. 
We all remember the chapters of his 
Confessions, where Augustine relates how, 
after vainly trying to reach truth, and 
eventually faith, by means of reason 
alone, he had at last discovered that all 
the rational truth about God that had been 
taught by the philosophers could be grasped 
at once, pure of all errors, and enriched 
with many a more than philosophical truth 
by the simple act of faith of the most 
illiterate among the faithful. From that 
time on, Augustine was never to forget 
that·the safest way to reach truth is not 
the one that starts from reason and then 
goes on from rational certitude to faith, 
but, on the contrary, the way whose 
starting point is faith and then goes on 
from revelation to reason.l3 
Having once learned this lesson, Augustine indeed never 
failed to draw profit from it. He demands faith in the 
existence of God before he seeks to prove that fact rationally 
13 Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, 
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938,-rs:--
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in the De Libero Arbitrio.l4 The whole section which, in the 
De~ Religione, precedes the proof is concerned with 
establishing the priority of faith on authority and the 
reasonableness of faith.l5 Only then does he attempt to prove 
by reason what he already knows by faith. Both the effort to 
bring in reason to support faith and the clearly defined 
subordination of reason to faith are typical of the great 
African Bishop. 
To this list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, two 
other distinctive marks of the hand of Augustine may be added. 
The one is his affective method which culminates in the other, 
a great wonder at God \Vho may be enjoyed in mystical contem-
plation. The two may be treated together. 
As Augustine led Evodius along the path toward God, he 
came upon Wisdom. Wisdom is a part of the proof. But for 
Augustine it is more than a logical step in an argument. It is 
something to be admired and praised and sought. 
At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritude, 
tantum adsit perseverans voluntas fruendi, 
nee multitudine audientium constipata 
14 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243: n ••• neque 
quisquwm inveniendo Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit 
quod est postea cogniturus." Again, Ibid., II, 2, 5; PL 32, 
1242: "A. Illud saltern tibi certum es~eum esse. E. 
Eti~a hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum 
teneo." 
15 De Vera Religione, chapters 24-28; PL 34, 141-144. 
-- f 
secludit venientes, nee peragitur tempore, 
nee migrat locis, nee nocte intercipitur, 
nee umbra intercluditur, nee sensibus 
corporis subjacet.l6 
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And again he says: "Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere 
illam si potes, et fruere illa, et delectare in Domino, et 
dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui.nl7 Now, for Augustine, God 
is, above all, Truth. He has said it in the works of which we 
have given an account. He said it often, but nowhere more 
clearly than in the De Trinitate: uEcce vide, si potes, o anima 
pergravata corpore quod corrumpitur, et onusta terrenis 
cogitationibus multis et variis; ecce vide, si potes; Deus 
Veritas est.nl8 
When we realize this fact, we understand the Saint's 
insistence upon embracing the truth. This grasp of truth may 
be only that which is ordinarily permitted to men. It may 
amount to supernatural ecstasy. Boyer believes that the logical 
culmination of the argument was, for Augustine, a mystical 
vision of God.l9 Surely there are texts which bear out the 
opinion. 
In the De Ordine, after proving the existence of God, 
16 De Libero Arbitrio, II, 14, 38; PL 32, '1262. 
17 IOid., II, 13, 35; PL 32, 1260. 
18 ue'Trinitate, VIII, 2, 3; PL 42, 949. 
19 BOyer, Essais, 77-96. 
st. Augustine breaks out into ecstatic praise of Him. 
Cum autem se composuerit et·ordinaverit, 
ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, 
audebit jam Deum videre, atque ipsum 
fontem unde manat omne verum, ipsumque 
Patrem Veritatis. Deus magne, qui erunt 
illi oculi l Quam sani, quam decori, quam 
valentes, quam constantes, quam sereni, 
quam beati J Quid autem est illud quod 
vident? quid, quaeso? Quid arbitremur, 
quid aestimemus, quid loquamur? Quotidiana 
verba occurrunt, et sordidata aunt omnia 
vilissimis rebus. Nihil amplius dicam, 
nisi promitti nobis aspectum pulchritudinis, 
cujus imitatione pulchra cujus comparatione 
foeda sunt caetera.20 
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And the famous passage in the Confessiones, already so often 
referred to and quoted, seems to corroborate the opinion that 
this last step is ecstasy.21 
Furthermore, in the Confessiones and the De Trinitate, 
St. Augustine describes what might be a supernatural vision. 
It is brief and difficult to retain: "Ecce in ipso primo ictu 
quo velut corruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur Veritas, 
mane, si potes. Sed non potes; relaberis in ista solita 
atque terrena."22 It is granted to few, the clean of heart: 
Sed et priusquam videamus conspicere atque 
percipere Deum, sicut conspici et percipi 
potest, quod mundicordibus licet: Beati enim 
mundicordes, quia ipsi Deum videbunt; nisi 
per fidem diligatur, non poterit cor mundari 
20 De Ordine, II, 19, 61; PL 32, 1019. 
21 COnfessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742. 
22 De Trinitate, VIII, 2, 3; PL 42, 949. 
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quo ad eum videndum sit aptum et idoneum.23 
Possibly it is supernatural ecstasy which is described 
in the Confessiones, where St. Augustine describes a special 
sort of vision • 
••• et venimus in mentes nostras et trans-
cendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem 
ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis 
Israel in aeternum veritatis pabulo, et 
ubi vita sapientia est, per quam fiunt 
omnia ista, et quae fuerunt, et quae 
futura aunt, et ipsa non fit, sed sic 
est ut fuit, et sic erit semper; quin 
potius fuisse et futurum esse non est 
in ea, sed esse solum, quoniam aeterna 
eat; nam fuisse et futurum esse, non est 
aeternum. Et dum loquimur et inhiamus 
illi, attingimus earn modice toto ictu 
cordia.24 
We are not concerned here, however, to prove that the 
argument for God's existence finds its culmination in ecstasy. 
It is enough to have shown that Augustine's method here, as in 
all his works, is ~ffective, that it tends toward union with 
that -Which it seeks. 
These features of the proof, then, are characteristic of 
St. Augustine's style, procedure, and way of thinking: the 
discursive nature of the argument, the rhetorical flourishes 
in style, the psychological approach to the problem, the 
23 Ibid., VIII, 4, 6; PL 42, 951. 
24 CO:nfessiones, IX, 10, 24; PL 32, 774. 
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indications of a Neoplatonic philosophical background, and 
finally the affective method leading to an enjoyment of God, 
probably in mystical contemplation. Thus, as this is "la 
demonstration augustinienne par excellence," it is also a proof 
typical in every way of St. Augustine's method and manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The picture would seem to be complete. But before the 
"pin.xit" is affixed in the corner, it might be well to make a 
rapid review of the whole process, from the broad sketch to the 
detailed drawing, from the critical testing to the appreciation. 
First was given a faithful account of St. Augustin6's 
proof for the existence of God as he traced it out most fully 
in the De Libero Arbitrio. Then, in order that the route he 
took stand out more clearly, that same route was followed in 
the De Vera Religione. Finally, the whole itinerary was gone 
over once again, and a master chart, as it were, was compiled 
from directions given in several of the Saint's works. 
Next was the period of testing. Here it was first 
decided that the proof finally rests upon the principle of 
sufficient reason, for the argument ultimately proves the 
existence of God as the sole sufficient reason for the immutable 
truth which exists above our intellect. In the fifth chapter, 
in answer to the question, "Is the proof ontological?" the 
conclusion was reached that it. is ontological, inasmuch as it 
seems to involve an illegitimate transfer from the logical to 
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the real order. But at the same time it is not ontologistic, 
since it does not depend on a direct vision or God. With 
regard to the connection or the proor with st. Augustine's 
doctrine or illumination, although it seems clear that the 
Doctor did not argue rrom this doctrine to the existence or 
God, and although he did not explicitly use the doctrine in his 
proor; nevertheless, the argument does have an essential 
dependence on this theory, it it is to be considered a complete 
proor. Finally, the proor is entirely characteristic or st. 
Augustine, ror the distinctive marks or his genius may clearly 
be seen throughout it. 
This paper may end with the excellent observation which 
Gilson makes about the proor: 
\ Cette tendance proronde a trouver en Dieu 
seul la raison suffisante de l'id~e que nous 
avons de lui est le lien qui rattache ~ la 
" metaphysique augustinienne celles de saint 
Anselme, de ·saint Bonaventure, de Duns 
S~ot et de Descartes; mais, en u~ sens, la 
demonstration qu'il en propose depasse 
de beaucoup celles qu 1 elle a inspir6es, car 
elle n 1 est ni un argument, ni une suite 
d'arguments, mais une metaphysique compl~te, 
plus une morale, avec la mystique m~me ~ui 
la couronne. Le doute initial, l'appel a 
la roi, l'evidence de la pens~e, la spiri-
tualit~ de l'ime et la transcendance de la 
~v6rit~, chacun des moments successifs de la 
preuve est la traduction d'une experience '-. 
personelle qu'il importe de m~diter pour 
, I' que 1 1 interpretation metaphysique en 
devienne intelligible.l 
1 Gilson, Introduction, 29 
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